Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B 9/30/99
of the critical fuel tank is important. Factors such as size, fuel cell design and
construction, and material(s) should be accounted for when selecting the critical tank.
The applicant may elect to drop only a bare fuel cell, not a surrounding structural
airframe segment with a fuel cell installed. If so, the applicant must show that puncture
hazards to the fuel cell have been eliminated.
(i) If the applicant elects to perform the drop test with surrounding aircraft
structure, the cell should be enclosed in enough surrounding structure (production or
simulated) so that the airframe/fuel tank interaction during the 50-foot drop is
realistically evaluated. This allows the fuel-tight integrity of the “as installed” fuel cell to
be evaluated and may provide protection in some designs due to the energy absorption
of the surrounding airframe when crushed by impact. This provides realistic testing of
fuel cell rupture points caused by installation design features, projections, excessive
deformation and local tearout of fittings, joints, or lacings. The amount of actual (or
simulated) structure included in the test requires engineering evaluation, risk
assessment, and detailed analysis and may require subassembly (e.g., joint) tests for
proper determination. Typically, the structure surrounding and extending 1 foot forward
and aft of the fuel cell is adequate. This structure has a high probability of causing
crash-induced fuel cell leakage. Each application should be examined individually to
include all potential structural hazards. If the surrounding structure is clearly shown not
to be a contributing hazard for the drop test, and if the applicant elects to do so, the fuel
cell may be conservatively dropped alone. This determination should be carefully made
by a detailed engineering evaluation. The evaluation should use standard, finite
element-based programs (e.g., ‘KRASH”, NASTRAN, etc.) or similar programs
submitted during certification, subassembly or component tests. Elimination of the
surrounding structure for the drop test configuration is not trivial. If elimination is applied
for, the data should clearly and conclusively show that the surrounding structure is not
an impact hazard. In any case, the drop height is a constant 50 feet. The work that
determines the test article configuration should be summarized, documented, and
approved.
(ii) If the drop test is used to show partial compliance with the underfloor
fuel cell load factors of § 27.952(b)(3), test plans should be approved. Minor spillage
from the open vents is allowed. Full compliance to these load factors should be shown
by static analysis and/or tests. The intent is to provide a fuel cell that is fuel tight and
does not unduly crush the occupiable volume or overly stiffen energy absorbing
underfloor structure under vertical impact.
(iii) Immediately after the drop test, the tank should be placed in the same
axial orientation from which it was dropped and visually examined for leakage. Minor
spillage from the open vents is allowed. After 15 minutes, the tank should be
reexamined and any new leakage or seepage sources noted and recorded. Any
evidence of fluid on the plastic floor cover or tank wrapping sheet should be noted and
recorded. Any fluid leakage or seepage constitutes a test failure. This procedure
should be repeated immediately with the tank inverted and the vents plugged. The
inversion procedure will identify any leak sources on the upper surfaces.
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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