FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

         (5) Military Specification, MIL-H-25579 (USAF).

         (6) Military Specification, MIL-H-38360.

         (7) U.S. Army Publication USARTL-TR-79-22E, “Aircraft Crash Survival Design
Guide, Volume V---Aircraft Postcrash Survival”, dated January 1989.

NOTE: Section 4, “Postcrash Fire Protection” of Volume V of the Design Guide is the
modern update to MIL-STD-1290. Section 4 contains a comprehensive design guide for
military CRFS designs that may be useful for civil CRFS designs.

      c. Conceptual Definitions.

         (1) Survivable Impact. An impact (crash) where human tolerance acceleration
limits are not exceeded in any of the principal rotorcraft axes, where the structure and
structural volume surrounding occupants are sufficiently intact during and after impact to
constitute a livable volume and permit survival, and where an item of mass does not
become unrestrained and create an occupant hazard. “Livable volume” relates to the
ability of an airframe to maintain a protective shell around occupants during a crash and
to minimize threats, such as accelerations, applied to the occupiable portion of the
aircraft during otherwise survivable impacts. In lieu of a more rational, approved
criteria, the load factors of § 27.952(b)(1) constitute the structural human survivability
accelerations limits.

         (2) Postcrash Fire (PCF). A fire occurring immediately after and as a direct
result of an impact. The fire is either the result of fuel released from a leaking fuel
system reaching an existing or a crash-induced ignition source, a crash-induced ignition
source internal to an undamaged or damaged fuel system, or a combination. PCF's
have an intensity range from the minimum of a small local flame to the maximum of an
instantaneous massive fire or fireball (explosion).

         (3) Fuel Tank or Cell. A reservoir that contains fuel and may consist of a hard
shell (of a composite, metal, or hybrid construction) with either a laced-in, snapped in, or
otherwise attached semirigid or flexible rubber matrix bladder (or liner), spray-on
bladder, or no bladder. The hard shell may be either the airframe (integral tank) or a
separate rigid tank attached to the airframe. The device has inlets and outlets for fuel
transfer and internal pressure control.

         (4) Ignition Source. An ignition source that when wet with fuel or in contact with
fuel vapor would cause a PCF.

         (5) Major Fuel System Component. A fuel system part with enough mass,
installation location hazard or a combination to be structurally considered in a crash.
Structural consideration is required when crash-induced relative motion can occur
between the part and its surrounding structure from inertial impact forces, airframe
deformation forces, or for other reasons.


                                                       Page E - 33

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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