FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 4

concern is the effects of degradations, discrepancies or failures in the basic helicopter
systems on engine governing laws and power available. Therefore, a review of the
FMEA before beginning engine failure or degraded mode evaluations should be
performed.

      (3) It is recommended to have special test equipment installed on the test engine
in order to simulate failures to the FADEC or digital engine control. Test risk mitigation
should include the evaluation of possible malfunctions of this special test equipment.

      (4) As a minimum, the following typical failures or degraded modes, including
engine control reversion that is based on safety analysis and ground test results, should
be evaluated in flight:

            (i) Failure causing the engine to increase power.

             (ii) Failure causing the engine to decrease power.

              (iii) Failure fixing the engine power at a static value.

          (iv) Failure introducing oscillations.

         (v) Failure introducing lower acceleration or deceleration.

          (vi) Failure causing the N2/NR to increase or decrease.

   (2) Vibration.

        (i) Explanation. Engine airflow patterns are deflected or distorted by the presence
of airframe inlet hardware, cowling, fuselage panels, and, to a degree, in almost all flight
regimes. Additional items such as airframe installed particle separators, deflectors for
snow, ice, or sand protection, and obstructions forward of the engine inlet, such as a
hoist kit, could affect the engine air flow patterns. The rotating elements of the engine,
particularly the compressor blades, will be subjected to a cyclically varying air flow as
these elements move into and out of areas of deflected airflow to the engine. A
corresponding aerodynamic load will be imposed on these engine elements. Since this
loading is also cyclic, the possibility of critical frequency coupling with an engine
component shall be investigated.

         (ii) Procedure. Typically, this evaluation would involve installation in the engine
inlet of a special multiple probe, total pressure sensing system, and flight testing which
largely follows that prescribed for evaluation of engine operating characteristics as
described above. Data from these tests can be reduced to create a pressure map at
the compressor inlet face which, in conjunction with compressor speeds, may be used
to determine the frequencies and relative amplitudes of the cyclic air loading imposed
on the engine compressor blades. The engine manufacturer either supplies the sensing
probe or specifies its design and performance. Also, the engine manufacturer may


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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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