FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page D-129

PDF page 402 of 1196

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page, including its printed amendment and change markings. Extracted words support search; text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 402
AC 27-1B · D-129Open saved PDF here ↗
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

2/4/2016                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 7


             (C) RFM or RFMS includes a description of the new control in the cockpit
and its function and an RFM or RFMS note to the pilot is included indicating that the
helicopter hook emergency release procedures are fully applicable;

             (D) release meets the same certification reliability criteria adopted for the
helicopter certified hook, as well as other relevant requirements of § 27.865 and the
methods of this guidance or equivalent methods; and

              (E) release has no operational or failure modes that would affect
continued safe flight and landing under any operations, critical failure modes,
conditions, or combination of either. The following points should be considered:

                  (1) The long line should not be of an elastic material allowing spring up
when unloaded or elevated dynamics when loaded.

                  (2) The long line should have a residual weight allowing its release
from the helicopter hook when the long line is unloaded.

                  (3) The RFM or RFMS should include all operating procedures to
ensure that the long line does not impact the rotors after cargo release and during
unloaded flight phases.

                  (4) The hook should be designed to minimize inadvertent activation.
An example may be a protective device (cage) around the locking mechanism of the
long line hook.

                  (5) A means should be provided to prevent fouling of cables in the
event of rotation of the external load. An example may be the inclusion of a swivel or
slipring.

                  (6) Installation of long line provided with electrical wiring to control the
hook will generally represent a new electromagnetic coupling path from external area to
the internal systems that may not have been considered for type certification. As such,
the impact of this installation on the coupling to helicopter systems, due to direct
connection or cross talk to wirings, must be addressed as part of compliance with §
27.610, 27.1316 and 27.1317.

       (9) Cable

               (i) Cable attachment. Either the cable should be positively attached to the
hoist drum and the attachment should have ultimate load capability or equivalent means
should be provided to minimize the possibility of inadvertent, complete cable
unspooling.



                                                         Page D - 129

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

Explore the rotorcraft safety and certification approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 2dfac16a3644dc18997069cca78746c10726e4b70d3aba996fc87843ffe68a2b

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →