Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
The source, within reach.
Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.
This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.
AC 27-1B, Chg 7 2/4/2016
Some cargo hook systems may employ two or more cargo hooks for safety.
These systems are approvable. However, loss of any load by a single hook
should be shown to not result in loss of control of the rotorcraft. In a dual
hook system, if the hook itself is the quick-release device (i.e., if a single
release point does not exist in the load path between the rotorcraft and the
dual hooks), the pilot should have a dual PQRS that includes selectable, co-
located individual quick releases that are independent for each hook used. A
BQRS should also be present for each hook. For cargo hook systems with
more than two hooks, either a single release point should be present in the
load path between the rotorcraft and the multiple hook system, or multiple
PQRS and BQRSs should be present.
(ii) Jettisonable cargo hook systems. For jettisonable applications, each
cargo hook
(A) Should have a sufficient amount of slack in the control cable to permit
cargo hook movement without tripping the hook release.
(B) Should be shown to be reliable (see paragraph d.(1)).
(C) For HEC systems, unless the cargo hook is to be the primary
quick-release device, each cargo hook should be designed so that operationally
induced loads cannot inadvertently release the load. For example, a simple cargo hook
should have a one-way, spring-loaded gate (i.e., "snap hook") that allows load
attachment going into the gate but does not allow the gate to open (and subsequently
lose the HEC) when an operationally induced load is applied in the opposite direction.
For HEC applications, cargo hooks that also serve as a quick-release device should be
carefully reviewed to assure they are reliable.
(iii) Other load release types. In some current configurations, such as those
used for high line (or long line) operations, a load release may be present that is not on
the rotorcraft but is a remote release system. The long lines allow the pilot to not
release the line itself during repetitive loading operations. Examples are a tension
release device that lets out line under an operationally induced load, a personal rope
cutter or dedicated switches at the pilot controls. The release of the load through the
secondary hook on a long line presents additional risks due to the possibility of the long
line to impact the tail or main rotor after a release due to its elasticity. These devices
are acceptable if the:
(A) off-rotorcraft release is considered a "third release." This type of
release is not a substitute for a required release (i.e., PQRS or BQRS);
(B) cargo hook release, and the long line release are placed on the
primary controls in a way to avoid confusion during operation. One example of
compliance would be to place the cargo hook release on the cyclic and the long line
release on the collective to avoid any possible confusion in the operation;
Page D - 128
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
Start with the certification basis and the function.
Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.
A focused review, an agreed assessment package or ongoing support alongside your team. We can agree the relevant inputs and scope in the initial conversation.
This opens your email application.
Start a conversation
Tell us about your programme, the system you are developing and the support you need.
We can agree a focused use-case review, a defined evidence package or ongoing programme support.
This opens your email application.
Specialist aerospace expertise
Aerospace Consulting is led by Hussein Khimji, an FAA Designated Engineering Representative in systems and equipment, with a focus on system safety, flight controls and avionics.
We work with aircraft developers and systems suppliers to connect technical decisions, safety assessments and certification evidence.
This is the proposed introduction. The full About page will add your approved biography and associate expertise.
Systems engineering & development assurance
Tell us about the aircraft or system, its intended function, stage of development and the support you need.