FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 7                                                       2/4/2016


              (B) Jettisonable HEC systems should be able to absorb a minimum of 200
volts per meter (i.e., CAT Y) RF field strength per RTCA Document DO-160.

               (1) These RF field threat levels may need to be increased for certain
special applications such as microwave tower and high voltage high line repairs.
Separate criteria for special applications under multi-agency regulation (such as IEEE or
OSHA standards) should also be addressed, as applicable, during certification. When
necessary, the issue paper process can be used to establish a practicable level of
safety for specific high voltage or other special application conditions. The helicopter
High-intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) safety assessment should consider the effects on
helicopter flight safety due to a HIRF-induced failure or malfunction of external load
systems, such as uncommanded hoist winch activation without ability to jettison, or
uncommanded load jettison. The appropriate failure effect classification should be
assigned based on this assessment, and compliance demonstrated with § 27.1317 and
the guidance in AC 20-158. This should not be limited to the cable cutter devices or load
jettison subsystems only. In some designs, uncommanded load release or hoist winch
activation could also result from a failure of the command and control circuits of the
system.

                  (2) An approved standard rotorcraft test, which includes the full HIRF
frequency and amplitude external and internal environments, on the QRS and any
applicable PCDS, or the entire rotorcraft including the QRS and any applicable PCDS,
could be substituted for the jettisonable NHEC and HEC systems tests as long as the
RF field strengths directly on the QRS and PCDS are shown to equal or exceed those
defined by paragraphs d.(7)(vii)(A) and d.(7)(vii)(B) above for NHEC and HEC
respectively.

                  (3) The EMI levels specified in paragraphs d.(7)(vii)(A) and d.(7)(vii)(B)
above are total EMI levels to be applied to the QRS (and affected QRS component)
boundary. The total EMI level applied should include the effects of both external EMI
sources and internal EMI sources. All aspects of internally generated EMI should be
carefully considered including peaks that could occur from time-to-time due to any
combination of on-board systems being operated. For example, special attention
should be given to EMI from hoist operations that involve the switching of very high
currents. Those currents can generate significant voltages in closely spaced wiring that,
if allowed to reach some squib designs, could activate the device. Shielding, bonding,
and grounding of wiring associated with operation of the hoist and the quick-release
mechanism should be clearly and adequately evaluated in design and certification.
When recognized good practices for such installation are applied, an analysis may be
sufficient to highlight that the maximum possible pulse generated into the squib circuit
will have an energy contents' orders of magnitude below the squib no fire energy. If
insufficient data is available for installation and/or squib no fire energy, this evaluation
may require testing. One acceptable test method to demonstrate adequacy of QRS
shielding, bonding, and grounding would be to actuate the hoist under maximum load
together with likely critical combinations of other aircraft electrical loads and



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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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