FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page D-115

PDF page 388 of 1196

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page, including its printed amendment and change markings. Extracted words support search; text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 388
AC 27-1B · D-115Open saved PDF here ↗
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

2/4/2016                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 7


requirements of § 27.865 and the other relevant requirements of part 27 for the
proposed operating envelope.

Note: The approved maximum internal gross weight should never be exceeded for any
      approved HEC configuration (or simultaneous NHEC and HEC configuration).

       (2) Reliability of the external load system, including QRS.

               (i) The hoist, QRS, and rescue hook system should be reliable for all phases
of flight and the applicable configurations for those phases (i.e., operating, stowed, or
unstowed) for which approval is sought. The hoist should be disabled (or an overriding,
fail-safe mechanical safety device such as either a flagged removable shear pin or a
load-lowering brake should be utilized) to prevent inadvertent load unspooling or
release during any extended flight phases in which hoist operation is not intended. Loss
of hoist operational control should also be considered.

                (ii) Any failure mode of the external load system (including QRS, hook and
attachments to the rotorcraft) leading to a loss of the HEC should be considered a
Catastrophic event in accordance with the safety objectives in section 27.1309 of this
AC. Uncontrolled high speed descent of the hoist cable would fall into this category.
Failures leading to the loss of NHEC should be evaluated and considered to be at least
a Major event in accordance with the safety objectives in section 27.1309 of this AC.

                 (iii) The reliability of the system should be demonstrated by completion and
approval of the following:

              (A) A functional hazard assessment (FHA) to determine the hazard
severity of failures associated with the external load system. The effect of the flailing
cable after a load release should be considered.

              (B) A fault tree analysis (FTA) or equivalent to verify the hazard
classification of the FHA has been met.

             (C) A system safety assessment (SSA) to demonstrate compliance with
the applicable certification requirements.

             (D) An analysis of non-redundant external load system components that
make up the primary load path (e.g., beam, cable, hook), to demonstrate compliance
with the applicable structural requirements.

              (E) A repetitive test of all functional devices that cycles these devices
under critical structural conditions, operational conditions, or a combination of both at
least 10 times each for NHEC and 30 times for HEC. This is applicable to both primary
and backup subsystems.  It is assumed that only one hoist cycle will typically occur per
flight. This rationale has been used to determine the 10 demonstration cycles for NHEC
applications and 30 demonstration cycles for HEC applications. However, if a particular


                                                         Page D - 115

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

Explore the rotorcraft safety and certification approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 2dfac16a3644dc18997069cca78746c10726e4b70d3aba996fc87843ffe68a2b

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →