FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99

      c. Procedures. When suitable data is available, the heating system design should
be thoroughly reviewed to determine which system components and arrangements
must comply with each subsection of § 27.859. The method-of-compliance relative to
each subsection of § 27.859 should then be determined. Acceptable, but not the only,
methods of compliance are discussed on a section-by-section basis as follows.

         (1) For compliance with § 27.859(a), mechanical devices such as shrouds or
barriers should be used to create a double walled (fail-safe) condition, i.e., two equal
barrier failures must occur to allow carbon monoxide to mix with cabin air. Phased
inspections to ensure continued airworthiness should be considered, as well. The
purpose of these measures is to eliminate any system leakage that would allow carbon
monoxide (a poisonous gas) to enter occupied areas, incapacitate the crew or
passengers and cause a crash. Regardless of the method-of-compliance chosen,
periodic checks should be performed during certification using carbon monoxide
detection equipment to certify the leak-free integrity of the system. Several such checks
should be done during flight test, especially after rigorous maneuvers, to ensure no
leakage.

         (2) For compliance with § 27.859(b), heat exchangers should meet the
requirements of paragraph AC 27.1123, and be readily inspectable either by complete
disassembly or by use of other equivalent design maintenance provisions (such as
removable inspection covers). Inspectability should be demonstrated during
certification by a design review, an inspection demonstration or a combination.

         (3) For compliance with § 27.859(c), combustion heater designs, their
installations and their heater zones must be identified and thoroughly evaluated. The
most direct method of compliance for the heater, itself, is to procure units that already
have internal design features that meet the relevant requirements of this section;
otherwise, design features must be provided and evaluated during certification that
meet these same requirements. Several combustion heaters are approved under
TSO-C20 provides the procurement sources and the detailed approval standards for
these combustion heaters. Each heater, its installation, and its heater zone should be
reviewed against the criteria of §§ 27.1183, 27.1185, 27.1189, and 27.1191 (reference
paragraphs AC 27.1183, AC 27.1185, AC 27.1189, and AC 27.1191) to ensure
compliance. Next, the fire detector installation drawings and specifications should be
reviewed for each heater region. The review should consider all reasonable hazards
and failure modes of the heater and the detection system.  If not previously TSO
approved the detectors should be evaluated during the overall system certification
effort. The drainage and venting system for each heater installation should be reviewed
to ensure that areas of fuel or fuel vapor collection are properly drained or vented. The
capacity of each drain or vent should be determined and, unless impracticable, the flow
capacity should be a minimum of 3-to-1 over the worst case leakage anticipated
(including the adverse effects of surface tension). Finally, the drainage and ventilation
systems should be reviewed to ensure that discharges do not create external hazards
by entering or contacting external ignition sources such as engine inlets and hot
exhausts.  If an accurate determination cannot be made by a design review, ground


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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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