FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 2                                                           4/25/06

                    (iii)   Flotation time and trim requirements should be evaluated with a
simulated, ruptured deflation of the most critical float compartment. Flotation
characteristics should be satisfactory in this degraded mode to at least sea state 2
conditions.

               (iv)  A sea anchor or similar device should not be used when
demonstrating compliance with the flotation and trim requirements but may be used to
assist in the deployment of liferafts.  If the basic flotation system has demonstrated
compliance with the minimum flotation and trim requirements, credit for a sea anchor or
similar device to achieve stability in more severe water conditions (sea state, etc.) may
be allowed if the device can be automatically, remotely, or easily deployed by the
minimum flightcrew.

              (v)   Probable rotorcraft door/window open or closed configurations and
probable damage to the airframe/hull (i.e., failure of doors, windows, skin, etc.) should
be considered when demonstrating compliance with the flotation and trim requirements.

         (4) Float System Reliability. Reliability should be considered in the basic
design to ensure approximately equal inflation of the floats to preclude excessive yaw,
roll, or pitch in flight or in the water.

                  (i)   Maintenance procedures should not degrade the flotation system
(e.g., introducing contaminants which could affect normal operation, etc.).

                   (ii)   The flotation system design should preclude inadvertent damage due
to normal personnel traffic flow and excessive wear and tear. Protection covers should
be evaluated for function and reliability.

                    (iii)   Float design should provide a means to minimize the likelihood of
damage or tear propagation between compartments. Single compartment float designs
should be avoided.

               (iv)  Where practical, design of the flotation system should consider the
likely effects of an uncontrolled water entry and locate system components away from
the major effects of structural deformity.

              (v)   Visual identification of the helicopter following a ditching (and possible
capsize) is made easier by the choice of material for the construction of the floats that
has high visual conspicuity properties.

         (5) Occupant Egress and Survival. The ability of the occupants to deploy
liferafts, egress the rotorcraft, and board the liferafts should be evaluated. For
configurations which are considered to have critical occupant egress capabilities due to
liferaft locations and/or ditching emergency exit locations and floats proximity, an actual
demonstration of egress may be required. When a demonstration is required, it may be
conducted on a full-scale rotorcraft actually immersed in a calm body of water or using


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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