FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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PDF page 359 of 1196

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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99

                   (ii)   Normally deflated. Emergency flotation systems which are normally
stowed in a deflated condition and inflated either in flight or after water contact during an
emergency ditching should be evaluated for:

              (A) Inflation. The float activation means may be fully automatic or manual
with a means to verify primary actuation system integrity prior to each flight.  If manually
inflated, the float activation switch should be located on one of the primary flight
controls. These activation means should be safeguarded against spontaneous or
inadvertent actuation for all flight conditions.

               (1) The inflation system design should minimize the probability of the
floats not inflating properly or inflating asymmetrically. This may be accomplished by
use of a single inflation agent container or multiple container system interconnected
together. Redundant inflation activation systems will also normally be required.  If the
primary actuation system is electrical, a mechanical backup actuation system will
usually provide the necessary reliability. A secondary electrical actuation system may
also be acceptable if adequate electrical system independence and reliability can be
documented.

               (2) The inflation system should be safeguarded against spontaneous or
inadvertent actuation for all flight conditions.  It should be demonstrated that float
inflation at any flight condition within the approved operating envelope will not result in a
hazardous condition unless the safeguarding system is shown to be extremely reliable.
One safeguarding method that has been successfully used on previous certification
programs is to provide a separate float system arming circuit which must be activated
before inflation can be initiated.

               (3) The maximum airspeed for intentional in-flight actuation of the float
system and for flight with the floats inflated should be established as limitations in the
RFM unless in-flight actuation is prohibited by the RFM.

               (4) The inflation time from actuation to neutral buoyancy should be short
enough to prevent the rotorcraft from becoming more than partially submerged
assuming actuation upon water contact.

               (5) A means should be provided for checking the pressure of the gas
storage cylinders prior to takeoff. A table of acceptable gas cylinder pressure variation
with ambient temperature and altitude (if applicable) should be provided.

               (6) A means should be provided to minimize the possibility of overinflation
of the float bags under any reasonably probable actuation conditions.

               (7) The ability of the floats to inflate without puncture when subjected to
actual water pressures should be substantiated. A full-scale rotorcraft immersion
demonstration in a calm body of water is one acceptable method of substantiation.



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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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