FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 3                                                       9/30/2008

commonality in fluid-carrying components. A break in one system should not result in
fluid loss in the remaining system.

         (3) Dual actuators should be designed to ensure that any single failure in the
duplicated portion of the system, such as a cracked housing, broken interconnecting
input, or broken interconnecting output link, does not result in loss of total hydraulic
system function.

         (4) A manually operated mechanical system may be used as the alternate
system to a single hydraulic system if, after the loss of the single hydraulic system, the
pilot can control the rotorcraft without exceptional piloting skill and strength in any
normal maneuver for a period of time as long as that required to effect a safe landing.
The control forces should not exceed those specified in § 27.397 and flight
characteristics should meet the requirements of §§ 27.141 (b) and (b)(3).

         (5) The substantiation of the various system components should include
consideration for operation in the normal and alternate system modes.

         (6) The “extremely improbable” criteria noted in § 27.695(c) for failure of
mechanical parts may be satisfied by performing component fatigue testing and
establishing a service life through this technique.

         (7) Fatigue substantiation of the control actuator is required under § 27.571 and
should consider both the stresses imposed by flight loads and the stresses imposed by
hydraulic pump pressure pulses. Flight loads factored in a conservative way may be an
acceptable means to take into account both effects.

         (8) The possibility of jamming of the power cylinder may be shown as
“extremely remote” through a failure analysis that considers every possible system
component failure such as, but not limited to, ruptured lines, pump failure, regulator
failure, ruptured seals, clogged filters, jammed servo valves, broken interconnecting
servo valve inputs, broken interconnecting output links, etc.

         (9) Three acceptable means to meet the requirements of § 27.695(a)(2) could
be as follows:

                  (i)    Provide two transmission-driven hydraulic pumps, provided the pumps
are driven by the transmission during all flight conditions including autorotation.

                   (ii)  Use two electrically-driven hydraulic pumps if electrical power is
available to drive the pumps with all engines failed.  If this approach is used, the battery
must be capable of running both pumps plus all other required equipment necessary for
continued safe flight.

                    (iii)  Use a single transmission-driven pump and an electrically driven
pump.


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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