FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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PDF page 309

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 309
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AC 27-1B, Chg 3                                                       9/30/2008

AC 27.679.  § 27.679 CONTROL SYSTEM LOCKS.

     a. Explanation. The rule requires that if control system locks are provided, means
are necessary to prevent the rotorcraft from taking off with the locks engaged or, once
airborne, to prevent the locks from engaging in flight.

         b. Procedures. Three main approaches may be used to meet the
requirements of this rule.

         (1) The first approach is to provide a means to disengage the locks
“automatically” as the pilot operates the controls.  If this method is used, the means
must disengage the locks in a manner so that they will not automatically re-engage
during flight. The means may be physical removal of the locking device from close
proximity to the control system interface, with deliberate crew action necessary to return
the lock to the control system interface, or the means may be that the mechanism
geometry or actions, or both, prevent the locking device from engaging in flight.

         (2) The second approach is to provide locks that prevent take off with the locks
engaged. Acceptable means are features which prevent engine startup or which restrict
collective control operations to prevent sufficient lift for takeoff.

         (3) The third approach is to provide a means that warns the pilot when a flight
control lock system is engaged, such as through a non-cancelable warning message or
through distinct control lock markings which are clearly visible to the pilot under all
conditions (day and night).

         (4) Unless it can be shown that the control locks cannot be inadvertently
engaged (taking into account manufacturing tolerances and maladjustments), a means
should be provided that allows, in flight, a single pilot to safely disengage any flight
control lock. For example, the control lock design might include frangible fittings.
Further, the RFM should describe the appropriate pilot corrective action needed to
disengage the control lock system while in flight.

         (5) The rotorcraft Instructions for Continued Airworthiness should include
appropriate maintenance checks and procedures to be completed following modification
(for example, via STC or field approval), maintenance, alignment, or adjustment that
affects the flight control system locks.


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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