FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99


         (1) This paragraph discusses the regulatory requirement contained in § 27.661.
That requirement is that there must be enough clearance between the rotor blades
(main and tail rotor blades) and other parts of the structure to prevent the blades from
striking any part of the structure during any operating condition.

         (2) In the past, some rotorcraft that have been shown to comply with § 27.661
during the certification process have experienced subsequent accidents involving in-
flight contact between the main rotor and airframe (rotor/airframe contact). Completion
of developmental and TIA flight testing without a rotor/airframe contact incident has
proven not to be adequate demonstration of compliance with § 27.661 in all cases.

         (3) Historically, in-flight rotor/airframe contact accidents have occurred as a
result of mast bumping, rotor stall, or excessive rotor flapping due to control
manipulation. For some rotorcraft, a more thorough examination may be required to
ensure adequate clearances.

     b. Procedures. Testing should be conducted by the applicant, prior to
FAA/AUTHORITY participation, to ensure that the rotorcraft is in compliance with
§ 27.661 in all areas of the envelope during all operational maneuvers expected
throughout the life of the aircraft. The tests should be performed concurrently with
performance, flight characteristics, and flight loads testing. Tests should include:

         (1) A blade flapping survey to determine flapping angles/margins, blade
bending, and blade clearance from the entire airframe. Data may be gathered from
instrumented flapping hinges, instrumented blades, high-speed video from airframe
mounted cameras, a chase aircraft, or other acceptable means.

         (2) Determine that margin exists between the minimum rotor RPM encountered
during testing for compliance with § 27.143(d) and the RPM (power off) at which
analysis shows that the rotor will experience a significant stall. A significant stall
condition may be defined by the rotor reaching an RPM from which normal operating
RPM is unrecoverable due to drag on the main rotor blades or, a stall that results in
excessive main rotor flapping. The rotor RPM decay rate under the critical conditions of
weight, density altitude, minimum approved power-on rotor RPM must provide a margin
between the minimum rotor speed achieved during demonstration of compliance with
§§ 27.79 and 27.143(d) and the analytically derived rotor stall RPM for the same
conditions. For example, the minimum rotor RPM resulting during H-V tests must allow
for a margin above the rotor stall value to allow for variations that may occur during
operational flying.

         (3) During parts of the certification flight test program, frangible devices (wood
dowels) or other means of measuring clearance, may be requested to confirm that the
clearances shown in the drawings and verified during company flight tests are adequate
in all operating conditions. Balsa wood dowels or styrofoam pads may be clamped to
the aft part of the fuselage and cabin roof within the rotor arc. Such devices may be


Page D - 32

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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