FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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12/1/2011                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 4


discrete flaws, and impact or other accidental damage. This determination must be
submitted with accompanying rationale to the FAA/AUTHORITY for approval. This
rationale may include experience with similar materials, designs, processes
(manufacturing, maintenance, and overhaul), structural details, or structure, and may
also include service failure evaluations, manufacturing records, overhauls and repair
reports, field service reports, incident and accident investigations, service impact
surveys, inspectability surveys, and engineering judgment. Consideration should also
be given to factors that:

                  -  Reduce scatter and deviations from nominal structures, such as frozen
               processes, Flight Critical Parts programs, and materials and
               manufacturing processes to mitigate intrinsic flaws (inclusions and
                  defects).

                  -  Preclude a type of damage by use of a specific design feature
                 (material selection, surface treatment, protective coating, or shielding),
             a specific stress level (for fatigue damage), or a specific manufacturing
                 inspection process (if it can be shown to be highly reliable, well-
                  controlled, documented, and systematically required).

The assessment should include:

   •  A systematic evaluation of all the location, types, and sizes of damage and their
      estimated probability of occurrence.

   •  A selection or elimination of this damage based on the above estimate.

   •  A verification that the inspection method selected is capable of detecting the
     damage at the size and location determined.

The types of damage to consider include:

         (1) Intrinsic Flaws (imperfections), which are probable to exist in an as-
manufactured structure based on the evaluation of the details and potential sensitivities
of the specific manufacturing work processes used. The types of flaws to be considered
include voids, disbonds, inclusions, foreign objects, resin-rich and resin-starved areas,
and improper ply orientation or ply ending. The sizes of the intrinsic flaws considered
should be based on the limits established under the manufacturing inspection and
acceptance criteria and are expected to remain in service for the life of the structure.

         (2) Impact Damage, which may occur during manufacturing and in service
based on an evaluation of the threats by means of an impact survey and/or service
experiences. This type of damage can include dents, penetrations, gouges, abrasions,
and scratches. A threat assessment is needed to identify impact damage severity and
detectability for design and maintenance. A threat assessment usually includes
damage data collected from service plus an impact survey. An impact survey consists


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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