FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/4/2016                                                  AC 27-1B, Chg 7


                      (2) The visual means should be adequately placarded.

                      (3) The power should be measured at or near the point where it enters the
instrument.

                      (4) For electrical instruments, the power is considered adequate when the voltage is
within approved limits. The source of power for the visual means of indication must be independent of the
source of power for the instrument itself. Independent, in this case, means a separate circuit protective
device and a separate distribution system bus.

                (D) Multiple System Separation. Multiple systems performing the same function are
required in certain instances because it is probable that a single system will fail. Separation of such
systems would preclude a single fault from causing a multiple system failure. The following should be
considered:

                      (1) When possible, cable routing should be accomplished to ensure the maximum
separation; for example, one system routed on one side of the rotorcraft and the other system on the
opposite side. In some areas, physical separation may be minimal, as pedestals, junction boxes, and
equipment racks bring systems close together.

                      (2) Systems that are required to be duplicated should not be routed through one
electrical disconnect plug.

                      (3) System grounds should be evaluated to assure wiring for two required systems is
not grounded to the same terminal.  If a terminal strip contains grounds for multiple systems, it should be
grounded to the rotorcraft’s airframe in two places from two separate terminals.

                (E) Circuit Protective Devices. All systems that are “required” for IFR operation are
considered necessary for safe IFR operation, and the circuit protective devices for those systems should
generally be accessible to the crew in the cockpit so they can be readily reset or replaced in flight. Where
a capability is provided that is above the minimum certification requirements, accessibility may not be an
issue while additional equipment may be required for dispatch in IFR operation. The location of the
generator field protective devices has been a problem in some rotorcraft. The protective devices that can
result in the loss of a required power system source should be capable of being reset or replaced in the
cockpit while in flight. This position is further supported by the occurrence of nuisance opening of circuit
protective devices in rotorcraft. Further discussion on this issue is included in section 27.1357 of this AC.

                 (F) Intercommunication System.  All audio for the entire rotorcraft comes together at this
system. An evaluation should be made to ensure that no single failure would result in the loss of all audio
for the rotorcraft. Check for common grounds, common connectors, etc. Power inputs should also be
disabled.

        (15) RFM Material.

                  (i) In addition to other required information, the limitations section of the RFM or RFM
Supplement (RFMS) must include the approved IFR flight envelope, minimum IFR crew requirements, the
minimum required equipment for dispatch into IFR conditions that is not covered by the operating
regulations, and the maximum approach gradient that has been approved.  If a significant loss of altitude
is experienced in any flight regime or maneuver during certification analysis or testing, the emergency
operating procedures should include a statement of this altitude loss along with any other appropriate
information.

                    (ii) The limitations section of the RFM should not include restrictions prohibiting external
cargo operations. These operations are covered by parts 91 and 133, and all external load operations
conducted under these parts must be approved by the controlling operations inspector.  It is the



                                                                   Page Apdx B - 17

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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