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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 7                                                                       2/4/2016



                (D) System failure such as tripped circuit breakers, blown fuses, loss of busses, loss of
feeders, loss of ground terminals, and failure of electrical disconnect plugs should also be considered.

                (E) Routing of all wiring from each power source throughout the distribution system
should be reviewed. In all instances, feeder wires should be routed separately from small gage control
wiring. In addition, wiring for each power system should be separated to the maximum extent practical
from the wiring associated with other required power systems.

                 (F) A single electrical disconnect plug should not contain wiring for more than one
generating system. Many systems incorporate automatic feeder fault protection that disables a power
source experiencing a short circuit on its feeder, and in some instances, passive protection has been
provided for the feeders.

               (G) There may be other failures that should be considered that are peculiar to the specific
design being evaluated and, if so, an appropriate accounting of these failure should also be made.

                (H) Single engine rotorcraft upgrades from VFR to IFR will require careful evaluation of
the electrical system. These aircraft normally do not have distribution systems that can tolerate bus or
feeder failures, and these failures would result in loss of the entire electrical system. Normally these
systems are modified such that distribution system and power supply failures will only result in a partial
loss of electrical capability. The power supply problem has been accounted for by the installation of a
second generator in some instances or by adding extra battery capacity in others. When an extra battery
is added, or a larger battery is substituted, the ampere-hour capacity should be based on one-half the
time associated with a worst case maximum flight duration consideration. Additionally, in all instances so
far the standby attitude system has been provided a separate power supply capability, in addition to the
extra power supply capability described above.

                    (ii) Review of Regulations. The airworthiness regulations concerning electrical systems begin
with § 27.1301 Subpart F (Equipment) and continue through § 27.1401. Other rules may also concern
the electrical system; however, compliance with these sections should have been assured as part of the
original VFR approval.

                     (iii) Specific Emphasis Areas. In some previous installations, changes have been necessary
in the areas listed below. Future installations should be checked carefully in these areas and other areas
that indicate a need for attention.

                (A) Systems Affected by Icing. Gross inaccuracies in altitude and airspeed indicators
resulting from icing could be disastrous in IFR flight. For rotorcraft not equipped with approved alternate
static sources, static ports should be carefully evaluated and should either be heated or an analysis
verified by flight test data submitted to substantiate leaving them unheated. Static line routing should be
carefully evaluated for low spots. In addition, if static ports are on the side of the rotorcraft, the lines
should be initially routed upward just behind the static ports, then down to a drain.  If the lines are initially
routed upward, the lines will not fill with water when the rotorcraft is flown through rain or is washed.

                (B) Overvoltage Protection. A few rotorcraft may have this protection, but many do not.
Since overvoltage protection is specifically required for IFR operation, the rotorcraft’s basic electrical
system should be very carefully reviewed for this capability.

                (C) Power Adequacy Indication. Most flight instruments that use a power supply have a
visual means integral with the instrument to indicate the adequacy of the power being supplied. For those
required flight instruments that are not provided with a visual means, the following should be accounted
for:

                      (1) The visual means provided should be at least adjacent to the instrument.



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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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