Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 4 9/17/2009
(iv) § 27.143(f) addresses the special case in which a VNE (power-off) is
established at an airspeed value less than VNE (power-on). For this case, engine failure
tests are still required at speeds up to and including VNE (power-on), and the rotorcraft
must be capable of being slowed to VNE (power-off) in a controlled manner with normal
pilot reactions and skill. There is, however, no controllability requirement for stabilized
power-off flight at speeds above 1.1 VNE (power-off) when VNE (power-off) is established
per § 27.1505(c).
(v) Application of the controllability requirement for pitch, roll, and yaw at
speeds of 1.1 VNE (power-off) and below is similar to that described above for power-on
testing at VNE. Sufficient directional control must exist to allow straight flight in
autorotation during all approved maneuvers including 30° banked turns up to VNE
(power-off) with some small additional allowance for gust control. Adequate
controllability margins must exist in all axes throughout the approved autorotative flight
envelope. Testing to VNE at MC power per § 27.143(b) and § 27.175(c), and to 1.1 VNE
(power-off) in autorotation per § 27.143(f) should be sufficient to assure adequate
control margin during a descent condition at high speed and low power. The high
speed, power-on descent condition should be checked for adequate control margin as a
"maneuver appropriate to the type." There has been one instance where insufficient
directional pedal was available to maintain a reasonable trimmed sideslip angle with low
power at very high speeds, and a case where there was insufficient forward and lateral
cyclic available to reach the power on VNE. The insufficient directional pedal margin
was due to the offset vertical stabilizers. The lack of cyclic stick margin was because
the cyclic stick migrated to the right as power was reduced, and the control limits were
circular. This provided less total available forward cyclic stick travel when the cyclic was
moved right and forward about 45° from the center position. Each of the above
rotorcraft was certificated with a rate of descent limitation to preclude operation in the
control-limited area.
(vi) An evaluation of the emergency descent capability of the rotorcraft
should be made, either analytically or through flight test. Areas of consideration are the
rate of descent available, the maximum approved altitude, and the time before a
catastrophic failure following the loss of transmission oil pressure or other similar failure.
Each rotorcraft should have the capability to descend to sea level and land from the
maximum certificated altitude within the time period established as safe following a
critical failure. If the time period does not permit a sea level landing, the maximum
height above the terrain must be specified in the limitation section of the Rotorcraft
Flight Manual (RFM).
(3) The required controllability and maneuvering capabilities must also be
considered following the failure of automatic equipment used in the control system (§
27.672). Examples include stability augmentation systems (SAS), stability and control
augmentation systems (SCAS), automatic flight control systems (AFCS), devices to
provide or improve longitudinal static stability such as a pitch bias actuator (PBA), yaw
dampers, and fly-by-wire elevator or stabilator surfaces. These systems all use
actuators of some type, and are subject to actuator softover and hardover malfunctions.
Page 52.4
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