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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 118
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9/17/2009                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


near the ground such as rolling takeoffs for wheeled rotorcraft. On helicopters
incorporating a tail rotor, efficiency of the tail rotor decreases with altitude so that a
given sideward flight condition requires more pedal deflection, a higher tail rotor blade
angle, and more horsepower. Hence, directional capability in sideward flight (or at
critical wind azimuth) is most critical during testing at a high altitude site.

                    (iii) § 27.143(e) requires adequate controllability when an engine fails. This
requirement specifies conditions under which engine failure testing must be conducted
and includes minimum required delay times.

              (A) For rotorcraft that meet the engine isolation requirements of transport
Category A, demonstration of sudden complete single-engine failure is required at
critical conditions throughout the flight envelope including hover, takeoff, climb at VY,
and high speed flight up to VNE. Entry conditions for the first engine failure are engine
or transmission limiting maximum continuous power (MCP) (or takeoff power where
appropriate) including reasonable engine torque splits. For multiengine Category A
installations with three or more engines, the subsequent engine failures should be
conducted utilizing the same criteria as that used for first-engine failure. The applicant
may limit his flight envelope for subsequent failures. Initial or sequential engine failure
tests are ordinarily much less severe than the "last" engine failure test required by §
27.75(b). The conditions for last-engine failure are MCP or 30-minute power if that
rating is approved, level flight, and sudden engine failure with the same pilot delay of
1-second or normal pilot reaction time, whichever is greater.

              (B) For rotorcraft without transport Category A engine isolation,
demonstration of sudden complete power failure is required at critical conditions
throughout the flight envelope. This includes speeds from zero to VNE (power-on) and
conditions of hover, takeoff, and climb at VY. MCP is specified prior to the failure for the
cruise condition. Power levels appropriate to the maneuver should be used for other
conditions. The corrective action time delay for the cruise failure should be 1-second or
normal pilot reaction time (whichever is greater). Cyclic and directional control motions
are normally not subject to the 1-second restriction; however, the delay is always
applied to the collective control for the cruise failure.  If the aircraft flying qualities and
cyclic trim configuration encourage routine release of the cyclic control to complete
other cockpit tasks during cruise flight, consideration should be given to also holding
cyclic fixed for the 1-second delay. Although the same philosophy could be extended to
the directional controls, the likelihood of the pilot having his feet away from the pedals is
much lower, unless the aircraft has a heading hold feature. Rotor speed at execution of
the cruise condition power failure should be the minimum power-on value. The term
"cruise" also includes cruise climb and cruise descent conditions. Normal pilot reaction
times are used elsewhere. Although this requirement specifies MCP, it does not limit
engine failure testing to MCP.  If a takeoff power rating is authorized for hover or
takeoff, engine failure testing must also be accomplished for those conditions.
Following power failure, the rotor speed, flapping, and aircraft dynamic characteristics
must stay within structurally approved limits.



                                                     Page B – 52.3

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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