FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/4/2016                                                  AC 27-1B, Chg 7



                      (1) Hydraulic failure.

                      (2) Individual COMM, NAV, or intercom failure.

                      (3) Engine failure.

                      (4) Loss of any power input.

                      (5) SAS failure.

                      (6) Trim failure.

                      (7) Individual failure of each vertical and directional gyro.

                (B) Visibility during low approach conditions in precipitation.

                (C) Glare and reflections at night in clouds.

                (D) Workload demands on the minimum flightcrew including the failures in paragraph
b.(10)(i)(A).

                (E) Handling qualities in turbulence throughout the IFR approved envelope including
typical IFR flight maneuvers with:

                      (1) Reasonably anticipated SAS failures,

                      (2) Reasonably probable control system failures (hydraulics, force trim, basic ship
systems, etc.),

                      (3) The typical workload conditions associated with operating in high density traffic
areas, and

                      (4) Other reasonable, probable failures.

                 (F) Cockpit leaks in precipitation that affect pilot efficiency, safety, or rotorcraft
airworthiness.

                    (ii) Rotorcraft that are an improved, modified, or later model of previously approved type that
have no significant changes in the fuselage and windshield configuration, the aircraft lighting system, and
the rain removal systems do not need to be flown in clouds. They may need to be evaluated in clouds if,
in the judgment of the flight test personnel, there is some doubt as to the similarity of the configuration.
However, a previously approved rotorcraft undergoing IFR certification tests for a different SAS should
not require a series of actual IFR flights just to determine pilot workload or whether it can be flown in
clouds.

        (11) Static Position Error. The static position error should be reevaluated to determine altimeter
error during instrument approach conditions. This is particularly important when high angle approaches
(above 3°) are approved. Static position error for 3° approaches can typically be approximated by the
level flight error. The direction of error is important.  If the indicated value is lower than actual value, the
error is in a conservative direction and further investigation may not be required. The direction and
magnitude of static position error should be determined for steep angle approach conditions and
additional information provided when necessary in the RFM. An investigation of static system response
during the go-around transition should be investigated.




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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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