Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
The source, within reach.
Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.
This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.
AC 27-1B, Chg 7 2/4/2016
indicators are noticeably separated. When the standby indicator is located apart from the normal scan
and the primary indicator fails, the pilot is conscious of a distinctly different instrument scan and is less
likely to be continuously coming back to the center of the basic T for attitude reference. Physical
separation can assist the transition to standby attitude flight.
(ii) All cockpit controls necessary for normal and emergency operations should ideally be
located so that they may be actuated without upper body movement. Moderate head and body
movement has been accepted; however, these motions must be evaluated for their vertigo inducing
effects. No IFR controls should be located aft of a vertical plane passing left to right (laterally) through the
pilot’s body.
(iii) If a copilot position is approved, the copilot must have a complete set of flight controls and
must be capable of independently flying and navigating the rotorcraft from his position. The copilot must
be capable of controlling at least one primary navigation source so that he can operate the rotorcraft
during normal conditions without relying on the first pilot to perform needed cockpit functions. Some
instruments can be shared between pilots depending on instrument panel presentation. Some examples
from previous programs include standby attitude, rotor tachometer (if the aircraft has automatic governing
and the crew is provided visual and aural RPM warning), and secondary powerplant instruments such as
Ng, oil pressure, and temperature.
(iv) Proper cockpit annunciation is essential for safe operation. SAS and autopilot modes
must be properly annunciated. Appropriate annunciator color coding is contained in § 27.1322. There
must be no question in regard to the source of navigation information presented to the crew. Where
navigation switching is available between individual displays and between pilot positions, the first pilot
should have overriding control for his displays.
(v) Electromechanical Displays. Due to the increased complexity of instrumentation that is
available and in use, it is appropriate to consider the extreme range of operational environments to which
rotorcraft were being routinely exposed. It is the intent of Appendix B to part 27, VIII.(b)(5) to prevent
degrading of the first pilot’s instrument system, or the only pilot’s instrument system in a single-pilot
approved rotorcraft, by not permitting connection of peripheral systems to it. In addition, equipment must
not be connected to operating systems for the second pilot’s required instruments unless it is extremely
improbable that failure of such additional equipment would affect that operating system.
(vi) Advanced Display Systems. The increased use of microprocessor technology in avionic
systems has resulted in the use of computer-generated graphics to replace conventional
electromechanical instruments. These displays may replace individual instruments or may integrate
several flight critical parameters into single displays. For display of redundant information, “crosstalk”
between the pilot and copilot displays and supporting systems has been allowed to provide detection and
annunciation of faults or “miscompare” of critical flight information. A level of safety finding equivalent to
that level of safety provided by Appendix B to part 27, VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii) may be possible through
the implementation of integration technology that will assure that failure of one system does not and
cannot adversely affect the other system. For those installation designs that employ integration
technology, adequate system testing and any analysis necessary must be conducted to assure that
failure of one system will not adversely affect the other system when demonstrating compliance to the
minimum safety level established by Appendix B to part 27, VIII.(b)(5)(i) through (iii).
(10) IMC Evaluation.
(i) As part of the flight test program, new rotorcraft undergoing IFR certification should be
flown in the air traffic control system in actual day and night instrument meteorological conditions. Items
for consideration during the IMC evaluation include:
(A) Ability of the rotorcraft to safely operate in the National Airspace System, including
crew capabilities to cope with probable malfunctions. Examples of failures imposed during this IMC
evaluation on previous programs are shown below:
Page Apdx B - 12
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
Start with the certification basis and the function.
Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.
A focused review, an agreed assessment package or ongoing support alongside your team. We can agree the relevant inputs and scope in the initial conversation.
This opens your email application.
Start a conversation
Tell us about your programme, the system you are developing and the support you need.
We can agree a focused use-case review, a defined evidence package or ongoing programme support.
This opens your email application.
Specialist aerospace expertise
Aerospace Consulting is led by Hussein Khimji, an FAA Designated Engineering Representative in systems and equipment, with a focus on system safety, flight controls and avionics.
We work with aircraft developers and systems suppliers to connect technical decisions, safety assessments and certification evidence.
This is the proposed introduction. The full About page will add your approved biography and associate expertise.
Systems engineering & development assurance
Tell us about the aircraft or system, its intended function, stage of development and the support you need.