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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/4/2016                                                  AC 27-1B, Chg 7


the probability analysis and the resultant malfunction configurations are primarily the responsibility of the
systems and equipment section.

                 (vii) No reasonably probable failure should result in a worse condition than that tested for
hardovers. For example, if a magnetic brake force trim system is employed, failure of electrical power to
the magnetic brake circuit may cause the cyclic control to fail, which may result in a more dangerous flight
condition than individual SAS hardovers. The overall control system is to be evaluated for all probable
failures to preclude hazardous failure conditions. Other areas for investigation include beep trim and auto
trim failures. The delay times of paragraph b.(6)(iii)(C)(3) are appropriate for all such failures. System
malfunctions may also include component failures that result in oscillatory outputs of the actuator(s).
These should be sustainable at least as long as the specified hardover delays, should be manageable
thereafter with hands on the controls, and should allow disconnect of the malfunctioning system.

                  (viii) Engine failure requirements are not entirely consistent with the SAS failure time delays
shown in paragraph b.(6)(iii)(C)(3). Engine failure time delays remain as specified in § 27.143(e), and
they are lower than corresponding SAS failure delays. Critical engine failure conditions should be
reverified during simulated instrument flight with primary reference to flight instruments. Lower time
delays for engine failure have been justified on the basis of immediate cues for the critical high powered
condition and requirements for engine failure warning systems. Many rotorcraft designs simply cannot
endure a 3-second time delay for critical engine failure conditions. Nevertheless, engine failure,
autorotation entries, and autorotation descent (for single-engine rotorcraft and multiengine rotorcraft
without category A engine isolation) should be evaluated in simulated IFR conditions, and these flight
characteristics must be acceptable.

         (8) Controllability.

                  (i) Control harmony should be present. There should be no objectionable cyclic to collective
or roll-yaw-pitch cross coupling.

                    (ii) Control forces following a control system malfunction such as a hydraulic system failure
should be low enough to allow completion of the intended flight.  It may not be possible to land early
during an actual IFR flight.

                     (iii) There should be no tendencies for pilot-induced oscillations; There should be no
sustained or uncontrollable oscillations resulting from the efforts of the pilot to control the rotorcraft.

                (iv) The control system should have sufficient resolution to permit accurate and precise
instrument maneuvers. Some control systems with high breakout forces in conjunction with low control
force gradients do not lend themselves to satisfactory instrument flight capability.

         (9) Cockpit Arrangement.

                  (i) The primary flight instrument basic T (or a modified T with VSI above the altimeter) should
be located as nearly in front of the pilot as possible.  All annunciations necessary for operation of stability
systems should be readily in view. Secondary flight (or navigation) instruments such as radar altimeter
and secondary radio course information, DME, etc., should be grouped around the periphery of the T.
Next in priority are primary power instruments such as torque and rotor RPM. Powerplant instruments
and backup attitude information should be placed in the remaining panel areas. Various research and
development efforts and previous certification programs have revealed that it is desirable not to locate the
standby attitude indicator immediately adjacent to the basic flight instrument T. The standby attitude
indicator must be usable and flyable from the primary pilot station (and any other pilot station); however,
locating it too close to the primary instruments may be undesirable and should be evaluated.  If the
standby attitude information is close to the pilot’s normal flight instrument scan, he may begin to compare
attitude information between the two indicators in his normal instrument scan. Every pilot eye motion to
compare these indicators could be a wasted motion that could be more efficiently applied in the normal
scan. The pilot should fly either the primary or the backup indicator and it may be an aid if these


                                                                   Page Apdx B - 11

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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