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AC 27-1B, Chg 7 2/4/2016
the system should be considered as part of the design. The total system including inputs, outputs,
environment, isolation features, and exposure times is a pertinent consideration.
(iii) SAS reliability is evaluated by systems and equipment personnel. If credit is to be given
for system reliability and the applicant exempted from consideration of malfunction, hardover and
oscillatory conditions (limited to critical frequencies determined during autopilot failure analysis), a
thorough system evaluation is needed. Flight test personnel should coordinate closely with the systems
and equipment personnel whenever credit is given for advanced design and system reliability because
the hardover or malfunction condition may not require in-flight testing. The decision is made on the basis
of system design, failure analysis, and overall probability of malfunction. Multi-lane systems require
careful consideration when determining the need for hardover or malfunction testing of second and
subsequent failures. Factors to be taken into account are:
(A) Dissimilarity of architecture (hardware and software) between the multiple lanes
(B) Cumulative probabilities. For example, in a quadruplex system where each lane has
a failure probability of 1x10-4 and depending on system architecture, the level of criticality applied to the
software, and the potential for generic failures the probability of three lanes failing leaving the remaining
lane unmonitored would be a 1x10-12 event. In this case, testing of the third and fourth failures would not
be required.
(C) Consequences of a multiple failure, considering § 27.1309. A multiple failure should
not present a hazard to a category B rotorcraft or prevent continued safe flight and landing for a category
A rotorcraft.
(D) Operational restrictions post-failure. If it were possible to recouple the upper modes
and continue the flight without restrictions post-failure, then consider any subsequent failures with pilot
intervention times relevant to the phase of flight. If a flight restriction is provided, it should be determined
to be an appropriate and relevant operating limitation, and it should be specified in the RFM. Significant
information regarding the restriction should be made available to the pilot in the operating procedures
section of the RFM. If the restriction excludes operation under any of the flight conditions listed above,
flight testing of the condition is not required. If the system is to be approved without flight restrictions
(operating at all times), malfunctions should be demonstrated to be satisfactory during takeoff, climb,
cruising, landing, maneuvering, and hovering.
(iv) Applicable procedures and techniques for conduct of hardover tests are contained in
section 27.1329 of this AC. If a quick disconnect device is incorporated, it should be reachable with a
finger on the hand operating the appropriate recovery control and should be operable without removing
the hand from that control. A quick disconnect system can be used on duplex system if overall reliability
of the system is acceptable. All cockpit emergency controls including emergency quick disconnects
should be “red.” The quick disconnect may be actuated at initiation of recovery. Other disconnects
should only be actuated after full aircraft control has been achieved following recovery. Aircraft limits may
not be exceeded during malfunction or recovery. If a monitor device automatically disconnects the SAS,
it must be clearly annunciated to the crew. Appropriate delay times are shown in paragraph
b.(6)(iii)(C)(3).-
(v) Series actuator hardover conditions in some rotorcraft can seriously degrade control
margin. Critical loadings, power settings, RPM, and altitudes in conjunction with a SAS actuator hardover
in an adverse direction can result in reduction of control travel requiring flight envelope constraints. Flight
testing is usually necessary to determine the appropriate flight envelope reductions.
(vi) Subsequent failures and unrelated probable combinations of failures must be considered,
including subsequent SAS failures. Systems and equipment section analysis should provide necessary
SAS malfunction combinations for flight testing because of their system analysis. Minimum requirements
for dispatch and procedures following failure should be included in the malfunction analysis. Results of
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