FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 113
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AC 27-1B, Chg 4                                                     3/31/2014


rotor speed, flapping, and aircraft dynamic characteristics must stay within structurally
approved limits.

          (iv) Section 27.143(e) addresses the special case in which a VNE (power-off) is
established at an airspeed value less than VNE (power-on). For this case, engine failure
tests are still required at speeds up to and including VNE (power-on), and the rotorcraft
must be capable of being slowed to VNE (power-off) in a controlled manner with normal
pilot reactions and skill. There is, however, no controllability requirement for stabilized
power-off flight at speeds above 1.1 VNE (power-off) when VNE (power-off) is established
per § 27.1505(c).

         (v) Application of the controllability requirement for pitch, roll, and yaw at
speeds of 1.1 VNE (power-off) and below is similar to that described above for power-on
testing at VNE. Sufficient directional control must exist to allow straight flight in
autorotation during all approved maneuvers including 30° banked turns up to VNE
(power-off) with some small additional allowance for gust control. Adequate
controllability margins must exist in all axes throughout the approved autorotative flight
envelope. Testing to VNE at MCP per § 27.143(b), 1.1 VNE at power for 0.9 VH per
§ 27.175(b) or § 27.1505, and to 1.1 VNE (power-off) in autorotation per § 27.143(e)
should be sufficient to assure adequate control margin during a descent condition at
high speed and low power. The high speed, power-on descent condition should be
checked for adequate control margin as a “maneuver appropriate to the type.” There
has been one instance where insufficient directional pedal was available to maintain a
reasonable trimmed sideslip angle with low power at very high speeds, and a case
where there was insufficient forward and lateral cyclic available to reach the power-on
VNE. The insufficient directional pedal margin was due to the offset vertical stabilizers.
The lack of cyclic stick margin was because the cyclic stick migrated to the right as
power was reduced, and the control limits were circular. This provided less total
available forward cyclic stick travel when the cyclic was moved right and forward about
45° from the center position. Each of the above rotorcraft was certificated with a rate of
descent limitation to preclude operation in the control-limited area.

          (vi) An evaluation of the emergency descent capability of the rotorcraft should
be made, either analytically or through flight test. Areas of consideration are the rate of
descent available, the maximum approved altitude, and the time before a catastrophic
failure following the loss of transmission oil pressure or other similar failure. Each
rotorcraft should have the capability to descend to sea level and land from the maximum
certificated altitude within the time period established as safe following a critical failure.
If the time period does not permit a sea level landing, the maximum height above the
terrain must be specified in the limitation section of the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM).

      (3) The required controllability and maneuvering capabilities must also be
considered following the failure of automatic equipment used in the control system
(§ 27.672). Examples include stability augmentation systems (SAS), stability and
control augmentation systems (SCAS), automatic flight control systems (AFCS),



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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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