FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


            (i) Careful consideration has to be given to the method implemented by the
applicant to simulate the engine failure. As of today, two different methods have been
used:

           (A) Reducing one engine to flight idle and using the other engine up to a limit
chosen by the applicant.

           (B) Reducing both engines to an intermediate power and use the total power
available to simulate the OEI power.

             (ii) The second method is expected to provide better acceleration
characteristics in case a failure occurs to one engine during the use of training mode.
However, if an applicant would like to implement the first method, evidence has to be
provided that the engine accelerating characteristics are acceptable. In both cases, the
OEI training engine acceleration characteristics have to be demonstrated by the
applicant for the envelope for which approval of the system is sought.

      (6) Human Interface Aspects. The human interface aspects of the system have to
be carefully considered and appropriately addressed in the certification plan. The
information provided to the flightcrew during normal operation of the system and during
emergency situation is the main subject of the investigation in order to assess the
effectiveness and avoid misleading information on the status of the system that can
result in flightcrew errors. During the assessment, consideration should be given to:

            (i) Color coding.

             (ii) Labeling of the controls (e.g., switches, buttons, etc.) used by the training
mode.

              (iii) Clear and unambiguous identification of the status of the system; all the
parameters that are presented to the flightcrew in a modified scale have to be clearly
identified and easily recognizable by the flightcrew.

          (iv) OEI training control segregated from the standard engine controls.

         (v) Flightcrew alerts.  If flightcrew alerts are generated by the OEI training
system, consideration should be given to the following points:

           (A) Prioritization of OEI training alerts with respect to those generated in case
of actual failures. The OEI training alerts should not change the priority given to the
helicopter systems alerts or introduce a delay when these are generated.

           (B) Capability of the flightcrew to distinguish the OEI training alerts from
those generated by the other helicopter systems. Distinguishable alerts will prevent
flightcrew confusion of the actual status of the rotorcraft.


                                                       Page MG 22 - 3

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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