FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 2                                                           4/12/06

engine controls; however, the purpose could also be extended to simulate an engine
failure during other conditions (i.e., failure during the cruise). In any case, the maneuver
to be simulated with its initial and final points has to be clearly identified by the applicant
in order to prepare the certification plan.

      (2) Functional Hazard Assessment.

            (i) The purpose of the system is the input for the hazard assessment where all
the potential failures are identified and appropriately classified taking into account the
most critical phase of flight, thus establishing in a systematic way the integrity levels
required for each function provided.  It is to be noted that an OEI Training Mode is
designed to increase the level of safety relative to traditional training operations and
therefore the design of the systems should be such that the associated functional
failures are never more severe than those associated to an engine cut intentionally to
idle.  It should be recognized, however, that operation in training mode is an intentional
operation in a degraded condition and that the consequences of certain failures may be
more severe than those expected in normal operation.

             (ii) The functional hazard assessment has to take into account the other
systems that interact with the OEI Training Mode (typically the engine control system
and the cockpit displays) and all the potential failures that can occur during operation of
the training mode. The effect of engine failures and malfunctions that are likely to occur
during the operation of the system need to be taken into account. The functional hazard
assessment should also cover the failure associated with the safety devices introduced
in the system.

      (3) Engine failures. Actual engine failure while in OEI training mode should be
addressed. While recognizing that an actual failure during training mode is potentially
more severe than one during normal operation, adequate safety devices should be
provided to minimize the consequences of actual engine failure during training mode.

      (4) Display of powerplant instruments. There may be different ways to present the
engine data during the OEI training mode functioning. Past experience has shown that
some applicants have developed systems where during the simulation, engine limits
and associated cautions and warnings are re-scaled in order to present to the flightcrew
the same scenario that would occur in case of an actual engine failure. As the current
part 29 requirements (including § 29.1305) do not allow displaying biased parameters,
the applicant should show an equivalent level of safety with respect to §§ 29.1305 and
27.1549. In particular, while the training mode is engaged, the pilot being trained
should be provided with a set of information related to the training drill and not be
confused by other data; the safety pilot or instructor should be informed of any abnormal
conditions.  If a rotor droop is generated during the training maneuver, it is acceptable
that the NR indicator shows the limits relevant to OEI conditions even if both engines
are running.

      (5) Management of Engine Power.


Page MG 22 - 2

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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