Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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2/4/2016 AC 27-1B, Chg 7
(D) communications,
(E) operation and monitoring of all essential rotorcraft systems,
(F) command decisions, and
(G) the accessibility and ease of operation of necessary controls by the appropriate
crewmember assuming:
(1) Crewmember at flight or duty station.
(2) Normal, non-normal, and emergency conditions.
(xiv) Section 27.1525. This regulation does not differentiate between the types of activities
and areas that must be considered for the different kinds of operations for which the rotorcraft is
approved. A source to assist with workload areas is Appendix D to part 25, coupled with the kinds of
operations sought in accordance with § 27.1525. In many cases, the minimum crew size is set by design,
before any pilot workload evaluations are conducted. This is a common practice, as the rotorcraft
performance characteristics and cockpit configuration may resemble other FAA-certificated models
produced by the manufacturer.
(A) The process and level of evaluation for determining minimum crew for these
situations will depend on the differences between already certificated models and configurations, and the
model or configuration seeking certification. There needs to be a much more thorough evaluation for a
new model than for a follow-on model or a model with minor modifications to the cockpit. Regardless of
the level of difference or modification, evaluate all new or modified systems or new procedures for impact
on the proposed minimum crew and the pilot or system interface. For rotorcraft with an established
minimum crew, the purpose of this testing will be to corroborate by demonstration the predicted crew
workload submitted by applicants in order to substantiate compliance with § 27.1523. Testing is also to
provide an independent and comprehensive assessment of individual crewmember workload in a realistic
operating environment. Any problems or issues identified with the system would most likely be resolved
through design or procedural changes.
(B) Supplemental type certificate or amended type certificate modifications to avionics
systems can significantly alter pilot workload, particularly if the modification adds new digital or electronic
display and flight guidance technology into an older, mostly “round-dial” or analog cockpit. Avionics
modernization modifications normally change pilot interaction with the rotorcraft. Integration of modern
systems with existing systems can create unintended workload changes that create issues with the pilot’s
primary function of flying the rotorcraft. For example, the performance capabilities of an older autopilot
can hamper the new capabilities of a more modern GPS installed in a rotorcraft. Enabling the new
capabilities by relying on the pilot to compensate for the inadequate performance of the integration is not
recommended and may raise issues regarding the original minimum crew determination.
(C) Assessment of pilot workload is critical in evaluating the effectiveness of the
integration of new technology with old. Net pilot workload may not increase or decrease, but it may
change from simple aviation to one of systems management. The type of workload change should be
assessed to evaluate the integration of systems. Designs that incorporate special pilot “work-arounds” to
account for incompatibilities between the new system and the existing systems may raise certification
issues. These pilot “work-arounds” can create issues for operators trying to exploit the new capabilities of
the system because they may not meet requirements in part 91 or part 135. Any time a design requires
the pilot to compensate or change the way he operates in the cockpit to account for an integration issue,
it should be questioned and corrected.
(D) Workload should be assessed through a logical process of analysis, measurement,
and demonstration. One acceptable analytical approach would assess workload as a percentage of time
available to perform tasks (time-line analysis). An evaluation that collects objective and subjective data
Page MG 20 - 19
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Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
Start with the certification basis and the function.
Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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