FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/4/2016                                                  AC 27-1B, Chg 7


                (A) The lock and its warning, if separate from the lock, should be easily discernable
during both day and night operations. Consider the color, location, shape, and accessibility of the device,
ease of removal by a seated pilot, and legibility of any placards, etc.

                (B) The system operation should be obvious. It should only be possible to install the lock
such that the warning placard is properly displayed.

                (C) When engaged, the lock design should limit the operation of the rotorcraft so that the
pilot receives unmistakable warning in the cockpit before takeoff by an effective means such as:

                      (1) preventing the application of sufficient engine power to attempt takeoff,

                      (2) preventing or changing a method of grasping or holding a primary control such as
the cyclic or collective, or

                      (3) use of an audio warning device that cannot be disengaged.

                (D) For rotorcraft with separate locks for collective and cyclic, where one lock is
removable independently of the other, each lock should independently meet these criteria.

                      (iii) Section 27.771. This regulation correlates with most of the other HF-related regulations,
particularly in situations where a pilot may allocate attention to a particular system or task at the expense
of flying the rotorcraft. Applicants should identify aspects of the pilot-rotorcraft interface that might require
significant or sustained concentration or physical effort which can lead to distraction and fatigue. Many
factors can affect concentration and fatigue, such as noise, vibration, seat comfort, excessive control
forces, and poorly designed displays, controls, or pilot-system interfaces. Methods of compliance should
focus on evaluation procedures that examine potential concentration demands and sources of fatigue for
the flightcrew. Some issues that can contribute to unreasonable concentration or fatigue are:

                (A) Pilot-system interface. Interface design can potentially result in a large concentration
trap. Interfaces that require substantial heads-down time in rotorcraft without stability augmentation
systems can lead to the rotorcraft deviating from the pilot’s intended flight path. The system’s ability to
support the pilot regarding input, cross-check, error identification, and recovery contributes to the
attention resources the pilot uses and resulting concentration. Evaluations on a bench or simulator where
the system interface is accurately portrayed can help identify potential issues. Flight evaluation will also
provide valuable information regarding the design and pilot’s ability to work with that design.

                (B) Display design. A number of factors associated with display design can ultimately
affect concentration and fatigue. Displays that are difficult to read or contain poorly organized
information, or lack necessary information, result in greater demands on pilot attention and concentration.
Conduct evaluations under operationally representative scenarios to assess the effectiveness and
usability of the displays.

                (C) Cockpit and system control design and function. The ease of identification,
accessibility, and usability of cockpit controls can affect the level of pilot concentration. Conduct
evaluations to ensure all cockpit controls are easy to identify, access, and operate as required in flight.
New control interfaces, such as touch pads or voice-command, should be evaluated in as many
operational environments as possible to assess the pilot’s ability to perform tasks requiring their use.

                (D) Pilot seats. Poorly designed seats have the potential to create fatigue. Evaluate
seats to determine if they contribute a significant amount of fatigue. Conduct these assessments using
test participants and gathering subjective data. Conduct assessments based upon the expected average
length of flight time the pilot remains in the seat, for a typical flight for the rotorcraft under evaluation.
Subjective comments should be solicited from test participants concerning muscle tension, “hotspots”
(areas where harder body contact is experienced), and body soreness or discomfort. Lateral support in
the seat pan and lumbar support in the seat back have been used to increase seat comfort.


                                                                   Page MG 20 - 11

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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