Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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9/17/2009 AC 27-1B, Chg 4
a demonstration of flare effectiveness with power recovery at the maximum landing
gross weight corresponding to the altitude satisfies the requirement for touchdown. The
flare must reduce the autorotative descent rate and forward speed to a reasonable
value (i.e., autorotative descent rate and forward speed consistent with that
demonstrated at sea level). If a complete company test program has documented the
all-engine-out landing capability, verification tests may be initiated at those limiting
weight conditions. If not, buildup testing should be initiated at light weight.
(ii) Demonstrated compliance with this requirement is intended to show that
the autorotative descent rate and forward speed at touchdown (less than 40 knots true
airspeed (KTAS) is recommended) can be controlled to a reasonable value to ensure a
reasonable chance of survivability for the all engine failure condition. On multiengine
rotorcraft, rotor inertia is typically lower than for single-engine rotorcraft. RPM decays
rapidly when the last engine is made inoperative. Due to this relatively low inertia level,
considerable application of collective pitch may be needed to prevent rotor overspeed
conditions when the rotorcraft is flared for landing. Also, when testing the final
maximum weight points, the pilot should anticipate a need for considerable application
of collective pitch to control rotor overspeed during autorotative descent, particularly at
high altitude. Some designs incorporate features that may lead to rotorcraft damage in
testing this requirement (e.g., droop stop breakage or loss of directional control with
skids) if landings are conducted to a full stop with the engines off.
(iii) The intent of this rule is to demonstrate controlled touchdown conditions
and freedom from loss of control or apparent hazard to occupants when landing with all
engines failed. In these cases, compliance can be demonstrated by leaving throttles in
the idle position and ensuring no power is delivered to the drive train. Also, computer
analysis may be used in conjunction with simulated in-flight checks to give reasonable
assurance that an actual safe touchdown can be accomplished. Another method may
be to make a power recovery after flare effectiveness of the rotorcraft has been
determined, showing that the rate of descent and forward speed can be controlled to
allow for safe landing. Other methods may be considered if they lead to reasonable
assurance that rate of descent and forward speed can be controlled to allow safe
landing with no injury to occupants when landing on a prepared surface with all engines
failed. Regardless of the method(s) used to comply with this requirement, careful
planning and analyses are very important due to the potentially hazardous aspects of
power off simulation and landing of a multiengine rotorcraft totally without power. The
OEI landing test is ordinarily done in conjunction with height velocity tests because
ground and onboard instrumentation requirements are the same for both tests.
(6) Prior to conducting these tests, the crew should be familiar with the engine
inoperative landing characteristics of the rotorcraft. The flight profile may be entered in
the same manner as a straight-in practice autorotation. It is recommended that for
safety reasons, idle power be used if a "needle split" (no engine power to the rotor) can
be achieved. In some cases, a low engine idle adjustment has been set to assure
needle split is attained. In other cases, a temporary detent between idle and cutoff was
used on the throttle. In a third case, the engine was actually shut down on sample runs
Page B - 36.1
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