Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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2/12/03 AC 27-1B, Chg 1
spectrum of paragraph d(2) and the structure should be capable of supporting this
loading after a partial failure for a sufficient time with respect to the inspection interval to
assure that catastrophic failure is extremely remote. In test demonstrations, the
damage may be initiated or simulated by cuts made with a fine saw, sharp blade, or
guillotine in those cases where it is not necessary and not practical to produce fatigue
cracks by tests. In those cases where damage is simulated at joints or fittings, bolts
may be removed to simulate failure if this condition would be representative of an actual
failure. In some instances, the fail-safe characteristics may be shown analytically. The
analytical approach may be used when the structural configuration involved is
essentially similar to one already verified by fail-safe tests, whether on a previously
approved type design, or on other similar areas of the design currently being evaluated.
The analytical approach may also be used when:
(i) It can be shown that the failure would be detected considerably before
the critical crack length is reached;
(ii) The margins of safety resulting from the analysis are well in excess of
the fail-safe residual static strength level; and,
(iii) The stress levels in the partially failed structure and the design are
such as to assure adequate crack propagation time relative to the inspection interval.
(5) Inspection. Detection of fatigue cracks before they become dangerous is
the ultimate control in ensuring the fail-safe characteristics of the structure. Therefore,
the manufacturer should provide sufficient guidance information to assist operators in
establishing the frequency and extent of the repeated inspections of the critical
structure.
g. Further Considerations.
(1) Control of Fatigue Sensitive Parts. Control of the part in manufacture,
operational service, and maintenance is vital to ensure the full benefits of the fatigue life
substantiation process. Any part that has been selected for fatigue assessment should
be considered using the following guidance. This is particularly important for safe life
parts with no damage tolerance capability. The details of the manufacturing procedures
and processes for fatigue sensitive parts, including material manufacture and source,
forging procedures, machining operations and sequence, and inspection techniques
and acceptance and rejection criteria should be established. Sensitivity should be
established on the basis of identifying the processes, which if incorrectly completed
could significantly affect the fatigue life. The tested components should be produced in
accordance with the above manufacturing procedures. For life-limited and fatigue
sensitive parts, the design and manufacturing standards should be frozen subject to
further evaluation by the design authority. Parts produced in whole or in part under sub
contracting or partnership arrangements should be subject to the same procedures.
Life-limited and fatigue sensitive parts should be marked with a serial number and
records relating to the marking maintained, such that it is possible to establish the
AC Page MG 11 - 15
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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