FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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4/25/06                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 2


critical impacts (i.e., those causing the most serious damage but are least detectable).
When simulating accidental impact damage, blunt or sharp impactors should be
selected to represent the maximum criticality versus detectability, according to the load
conditions (e.g., tension, compression, or shear). Until sufficient service experience
exists to make good engineering judgments on energy and impactor variables, impact
surveys should consider a wide range of conceivable impacts, including runway or
ground debris, hail, tool drops, and vehicle collisions. Service data collected over time
can better define impact surveys and design criteria for subsequent products, as well as
establish more rational inspection intervals and maintenance practice.

               (6)-  Three Zones are defined by Figure AC 27 MG 8-2:
   • Zone 1: Since the damage is not detectable, Ultimate Load capability is required.
     The provisions of paragraph g(5) above provide a means of compliance.

   • Zone 2: Since the damage can be detected at scheduled inspection, Limit Load
      (considered as Ultimate) capability is the minimum requirement for this damage.

   • Zone 3: Since the damage is not detectable with the proposed in-service
       inspection procedures, ultimate load capability is required, unless an alternate
      procedure can show an equivalent level of safety. For example, residual strength
      lower than ultimate may be used in association with an improved inspection
      procedure.

                    (iii)  FATIGUE TOLERANCE EVALUATION – MEANS OF COMPLIANCE.
One, or a combination of, the methods below should show compliance with the
requirements of this section. The Flaw Tolerant Safe-Life Evaluation or the Fail-Safe
Evaluation are to be used unless it can be shown that neither can be achieved within
the limitations of geometry, inspectability, or good design practice. In that case, the
Safe-Life Evaluation should be used. From current state-of-the-art with rotorcraft
applications, it is widely admitted that composite materials have good flaw or damage
tolerance capabilities and therefore the safe-life option is rarely necessary. Flaw
Tolerance evaluations are best suited for most composite structures, particularly those
with structural redundancy and inherent resistance to damage growth. Damage
resulting from anomalous or accidental events must be considered in the Flaw Tolerant
Safe-Life and Fail-Safe evaluations.

The fatigue substantiation should include sufficient coupon, element, sub-element, or
component tests to establish the fatigue scatter, curve shapes, and the environmental
effects. The substantiation should include full-scale testing but also may be
accomplished by analysis supported by test evidence. When spectrum testing is used,
the lowest load levels can be eliminated from the spectrum if they can be shown to be
non-damaging. The substantiation should include a static strength evaluation to show
that the required residual strength and adequate stiffness, accounting for the effects of
environment, are retained for the life of the structure or the appropriate inspection


                                                       Page MG 8 - 21

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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