FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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PDF page 706 of 1196

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3/31/2014                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 4


AC 27.1435. § 27.1435 HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS.

     a. References. The following sections of Part 27 are either incorporated in the
provisions of § 27.1435 or are otherwise applicable to hydraulic system design:
§§ 27.695, 27.861, 27.863, 27.1183, 27.1185, 27.1189, 27.1309, and 27.1322.

     b. System Design.  It is assumed that the hydraulic system will be utilized to
operate utility systems and the primary control system of the rotorcraft.

         (1) Section 27.1309(a) and (b) provides for functioning reliably under any
foreseeable operating condition and prevention of hazards after any malfunction or
failure.

         (2) The substantiating data should include a failure analysis that considers
every possible system component failure, such as (but not limited to) ruptured lines,
pump failure, regulator failure, ruptured seals, clogged filters, broken pilot valve
connections, and so forth. Also, consideration of the specific requirements of § 27.1435
should be included.

         (3) If the rotorcraft cannot be safely operated without the hydraulic system, the
requirements of § 27.1309(a) and (b) are met by dual independent hydraulic systems.
From the reservoir, hydraulic pump, regulator, connecting tubing, and hoses through the
actuators, there must be no commonality in the fluid-containing components. A break in
one system should not result in fluid loss in the remaining systems. The pumps should
be separated as far as practicable; i.e., on opposite sides of the rotor drive
transmission, on separate engines, or one pump on an engine and the other on the
rotor drive transmission. The tubing and hoses should also be routed with as much
physical separation as practicable. The purpose of this separation is to prevent total
loss of the hydraulic systems in the event of a malfunction such as fire or rotor burst
wherein one projectile could disable both systems.

         (4) Dual actuators must be designed to ensure that any single failure, such as a
cracked housing, broken interconnecting input, or output link, does not result in loss of
total hydraulic system function.

         (5) If installed, the pressure-indicating system is normally included as a dial,
vertical scale, or digital indicator. The indicator should enable the crew to detect
pressure trends. Paragraph AC 27.1322 concerns § 29.1322 regarding proper colors
for annunciators if used to supplement the indicating system.

         (6) A combination of analysis and tests should be included in the substantiating
data file to show compliance with the provisions of § 27.1435.





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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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