Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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2/12/03 AC 27-1B, Chg 1
(vi) There should be a means identified or provided for determining the
formation of ice on critical parts of the rotorcraft which can be met by a reliable and safe
natural warning or an ice detection system. A system utilizing OAT should include an
accurate OAT measurement since the onset of icing can occur in a very narrow
temperature band requiring sensitive and accurate OAT measurement. OAT accuracy
should be relative to the true temperature of the air mass. Total system accuracy
should be ±0.5° C in the -5.0° to +5.0° C range and ±1° C throughout the remaining
temperature range. The location of the sensor has been shown to be very critical and,
in effect, there can be a position error or other errors induced by ice formations or solar
radiation. If the system measures liquid water content, consideration should be given to
the fact that the actual LWC fluctuates considerably as the rotorcraft passes through an
icing environment. A warning system displaying or utilizing a peak or average LWC
value (rather than an instantaneous readout) should include sufficient conservatism to
provide a margin of safety. The value of an LWC detecting system lies in its utility as a
warning that ice is being encountered. The actual magnitude of LWC in combination
with OAT and MVD can be used to indicate the icing severity level. The U.S. Army is
developing an advanced ice detection system (1990) for potential application to
rotorcraft.
(2) In-flight Ice Detection Sensing Systems
(i) With the advent and development of In-flight Ice Detection Sensing
Systems (IIDSS) technology designed to warn flight crews of potential ice accumulation
on critical helicopter components, standardized guidelines for certification have been
established. These guidelines will permit applicants for new, amended and
supplemental type certificates under FAR 27 to present a rational compliance plan to
the respective Authority. Currently there are two types of IIDSS; advisory and primary.
(ii) The advisory system enunciates the presence of icing conditions. The
flight crew is responsible for monitoring the icing conditions as defined in the Rotorcraft
Flight Manual (RFM) and activation by the flight crew of the anti-icing or de-icing
system(s) remains a requirement.
(iii) The primary system has automatic control of anti-icing or de-icing
systems when the flight crew has selected the automatic switch position. The automatic
feature can be de-selected and the system reverts to advisory, where the crew is
responsible for monitoring the icing conditions and activating the anti-icing or de-icing
system(s). Neither the advisory nor the primary IIDSS are designed to operate on the
ground.
(iv) The following factors should be considered during the design and
certification of an IIDSS:
(A) The IIDSS display(s) status lights and/or crew alerting messages
must be located so that they are within the seated flight crew’s forward vision scan area
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