Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 4 3/31/2014
(2) Limit Loads. The simulated failure and the subsequent corrective action should
not create loads in excess of structural limits or result in dangerous dynamic conditions
or hazardous deviations from the flight path. Additional guidance regarding the method
of determining pilot recognition times and reasonable flight path deviations due to those
simulated failures is contained in paragraph b.(6) of Appendix B of this AC. Resultant
flight loads outside the envelope of zero to 2g will be acceptable provided adequate
analysis and flight test measurements are conducted to establish that no resultant
aircraft load is beyond limit loads for the structure, including a critical assessment and
consideration of the effects of structural loading parameter variations (i.e., center of
gravity, load distribution, control system variations, maneuvering gradients, etc.).
Analysis alone may be used to establish that limit loads are not exceeded where the
aircraft loads are in the linear range of loading (i.e., aerodynamic coefficients for the
flight condition are adequately established and no significant nonlinear air loadings
exist). If significant nonlinear effects could exist, flight load survey measurements may
be necessary to substantiate that the limit loads are not exceeded. The power for climb
should be the most critical of: (1) that used in the performance climb demonstrations;
(2) that used in the longitudinal stability tests; or (3) that actually used for operational
climb speeds.
(3) Maneuvering Flight. Malfunctions should also be induced into the automatic
pilot system similar to paragraph c.(1) above. When corrective action is taken, the
resultant loads and speeds should not exceed the values contained in paragraph c.(2)
above. Maneuvering flight tests should include turns with the malfunction induced when
maximum bank angles for normal operation of the system have been established and in
the critical aircraft configuration and/or stages of flight likely to be encountered when
using the automatic pilot. The altitude loss should be measured.
(4) Oscillatory Tests.
(i) An investigation should be made to determine the effects of an oscillatory
signal of sufficient amplitude to saturate the servo amplifier of each device that can
move a control. The investigation should cover the range of frequencies which can be
induced by a malfunction of the automatic pilot system and systems functionally
connected to it, including an open circuit in a feedback loop.
(ii) The results of this investigation should show that the peak loads imposed on
the parts of the aircraft by the application of the oscillatory signal are within the limit
loads for these parts.
(iii) The investigation may be accomplished largely through analysis with
sufficient flight data to verify the analytical studies or largely through flight tests with
analytical studies extending the flight data to the conditions which impose the highest
percentage of limit load to the parts.
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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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