FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


      (2) Cockpit controls. Evaluation of the cockpit controls should include the following
items:

            (i) Location of the automatic pilot system controls are such that their operation
is properly labeled and is readily accessible to the pilot(s).

             (ii) Annunciator colors conform to the colors specified in § 27.1322 (reference
section 27.1322 of this AC).

              (iii) A determination is made that the controls, control labels, and placards are
readable and discernible under all expected cockpit lighting conditions.

          (iv) Motion and effect of the autopilot cockpit controls should conform with the
requirements of § 27.779.

         (v) Annunciation should be provided if the autopilot disconnects for any reason
other than pilot action.

   c. Malfunction Evaluations. To preclude hazardous conditions which may result from
any failure or malfunctioning of the autopilot the following failures should be evaluated.
This evaluation should also account for any hazards which also might be caused by
inadvertent pilot action. The guidance in Appendix B of this AC should be used to
determine the appropriate reaction times of the human pilot to an autopilot malfunction.

      (1) Climb, cruise, and descent flight regimes.

            (i) Recovery from malfunctions should simulate instrument conditions or visual
flight conditions, depending on the category of certification that is sought. Justification
should be provided for recognition (e.g., audio or visual warning, excess deviation alert,
or acceleration cues in the case of a hardover). Continuous close monitoring of the
flight attitude instruments by the pilot may not be relied upon as a reliable means for
detecting low rate attitude deviations (typically < 3°/sec) and thus for determining the
point at which slowover recognition occurs. In such cases, analysis should be
employed to establish the recognition criteria for the particular helicopter and flight
phase, and the acceptability of the recovery. For each flight regime, the maximum
height loss recorded for all malfunction testing should be established. The applicant
should ensure that sufficient data is generated to substantiate a height loss figure that
can be used for an operational determination of a minimum use height, where
appropriate.

           (A) For cruise, the height loss is defined as the difference between the
aircraft altitude at the time the failure is introduced and the minimum altitude achieved in
the recovery, taking into account appropriate pilot delays as discussed above.



                                                          Page F - 43

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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