FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 4                                                     3/31/2014


function covered by this section. The following procedure discusses only those parts or
systems which are installed as a pilot aid. Appendix B of this AC discusses the
evaluation of stability augmentation systems.

   b. Procedures.

      (1) General.

            (i) The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can
perform its intended function of flying the rotorcraft and that it complies with the
installation, operation, and malfunction requirements of § 27.1329. In demonstrating
malfunctions of the autopilot system, generally servo actuator hardovers are the most
critical malfunction.  If this is the case and the autopilot system utilizes the same servos
and servo amplifiers as the stability augmentation system (SAS) and the autopilot
function cannot produce a more severe hardover than the SAS, then no additional
consideration is required for this malfunction. An evaluation using the guidance in
Appendix B of this AC would be sufficient.

             (ii) There have been autopilots approved which require the use of a monitor
since they cannot meet the hardover malfunction requirements. These approvals have
involved a finding of equivalent safety which is beyond the scope of this guidance.
Such findings of equivalent safety are made on a case-by-case basis.  If an applicant is
considering such a design, the applicant and the approving office should contact the
Rotorcraft Standards Staff specialists for guidance.

              (iii) The rule specifies that unless there is automatic synchronization, there
should be some method to indicate the alignment of the actuating device to the pilot.
The intent of this requirement is to provide a means such that the pilot does not
inadvertently engage the system into a hardover condition. One method of achieving
this has been the use of servo force meters. These meters monitor the current into the
servo motor and indicate to the pilot if a signal is being sent to the servo prior to system
engagement.

          (iv) Various autopilot systems have used a preflight test to assure adequate
reliability. The question that often arises is: Should the preflight test function be
interlocked so that the autopilot cannot be engaged if the preflight test has not been
accomplished? The guidance used in the past to answer this question is:  If the
preflight test is simple and rapid enough that the pilot may reasonably be expected to
perform such a test, then it is not required to be interlocked.  If, however, the preflight
test is very complicated and lengthy and a pilot who was pressed by a schedule might
skip such a test, then this preflight test should be interlocked.

         (v) Most of the autopilots which have been approved utilize series actuators or
servos such as those required for a SAS. However, this does not preclude the approval
of an autopilot which uses outer loop parallel actuation. This type of autopilot may be
particularly helpful in a VFR aircraft.


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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