FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Printed page F-30.21

PDF page 611 of 1196

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6/23/23                                        AC 27-1B, Chg 9


                  (i) Explanation.


              (A) The following discussion is written specifically for FADEC with an
alternate technology backup fuel control installed on part 27 rotorcraft that meet the
category A engine isolation requirements. The requirement for increased consideration
of lightning strike encounter effects on avionic equipment and systems has been
brought about by the increased use of avionics to perform functions, the failure or
malfunction of which could result in a hazard to the rotorcraft. The susceptibility of
current high technology avionic systems is increased by the use of large scale
integration, very large scale integration, and complementary metallic oxide silicon
technologies that exhibit a greatly reduced tolerance to large amplitude, low energy
electrical transients as compared to conventional bipolar technology, and the reduced
physical protection and electromagnetic shielding afforded aircraft avionic systems by
the advanced technology composite airframe materials. Additionally, processor-based
systems have the failure phenomenon of digital upset. A digital upset occurs when a
system, perturbed by an electrical transient, ceases proper operation in accordance with
its embedded software while suffering no apparent component or device damage.

              (B) Since elements of electrical and electronic engine subsystems are
typically spread throughout much of the rotorcraft, transients caused by lightning are
coupled into the subsystem interface cables and may damage the system or cause
upset. Effective lightning protection should be designed and incorporated into these
systems. Reliance upon redundancy as a means of protection against lightning effects
is generally not adequate because lightning electromagnetic fields and structural IR
voltages usually interact (to some extent) with all electrical wiring aboard a rotorcraft.

              (C) The testing and analysis outlined in this discussion are methods by
which the FAA may be assured that when the rotorcraft experiences “the foreseeable
operating condition” of a worst-case lightning strike encounter that the electronically
controlled engines will continue to “perform their intended function” and therefore be in
compliance with § 27.1309 as installed.

              (D) The definition of what constitutes a full authority engine control is not
at this time clearly defined. However, it has been accepted in past certification that any
control that relies upon the electronics for the function on which Civil Certification or
Military Qualification is based (e.g., rotor speed governing) is a full authority control,
regardless of the backup control mode provided. If engine certification or qualification
can be achieved without the electronic control that is subsequently added to achieve
improved operational efficiency in the aircraft, the control is “supervisory.” However, if
the controls used in a multiengine rotorcraft have a common failure caused by a
lightning strike that could result in simultaneous failures that would cause a reduction in
power greater than the loss of one engine, this would also be considered “full authority.”

Note: If OEI ratings are approved, cumulative loss of power from all engines must be
limited to allow flight manual performance based on OEI ratings.



                           Page F - 30.21

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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