FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

         (2) Compliance may be accomplished by a side-by-side arrangement of the
controls to allow either separate or simultaneous control.

AC 27.1151.    § 27.1151 (Amendment 27-33) ROTOR BRAKE CONTROLS.

     a. Explanation.

         (1) Amendment 27-33 added a new § 27.1151 that establishes requirements
for rotor brake controls. Paragraph a is intended to require design features which, for all
practicable purposes, prevent inadvertent brake application in flight even under
conditions of reasonably expected crew error or confusion.

         (2) Paragraph b requires warning devices to alert the crew if the brake has not
been completely released.

     b. Background. Inadvertent or undetected application of the rotor brake may be
expected to result in excessive heat and fire in the rotor brake area. Rotor brake
components are usually located integral with, or in close proximity to, rotor drive system
components and, in some cases, close to critical hydraulic main rotor control system
components. Fires in these areas would be extremely hazardous.

      c. Method of Compliance.

         (1) For paragraph (a), literal compliance can be achieved by lock-out devices
sensitive to the higher RPM range of the main rotor or other flight parameters, hydraulic
bypass or lock-out devices controlled by flyweight governor systems, or engines control
position, etc.

The guard required by FAR 27.921 does not, in itself, provide compliance with this
requirement. However, if careful evaluation of the overall control, including location,
guard mechanism, control manipulation requirements, accessibility, etc., provides a high
degree of assurance that inadvertent application will not occur, compliance may be
assumed. Also, if brake application does occur, annunciation appears and no
immediate hazard to flight operation exists, compliance may be assumed.

         (2) Alerting devices supplied to comply with this rule should provide a signal at
any time the rotor brake is engaged, including partial engagement. This means to alert
the crew could be:

- A warning light indicating the mechanical control position, or the position of the brake
for a power assisted system, or

- An unambiguous device warning the crew that the rotor brake is engaged (or partially
engaged), or




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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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