FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99


     b. Procedures.

         (1) Section 27.674 requires that the rotorcraft be shown to be capable of safe
flight and landing after a malfunction, failure, or jam of an auxiliary control
interconnected with a primary control. The section does not apply to interconnected
primary controls; e.g., cyclic and collective controls.

         (2) Examples of auxiliary controls covered by this section may include certain
autopilot or stability augmentation or trim system components. Section 27.1309
methods may be used in determining failure effects of autopilot and stability
augmentation “system” components. For components whose purposes are solely
mechanical functions, the procedures associated with § 27.571 for components such as
the main rotor may be used.

         (3) If an engine control could jam and result in a collective control jam, the
controls should be designed to relieve that connection.

AC 27.675.  § 27.675 (Amendment 27-16) STOPS.

     a. Explanation.

         (1) Stops are required to prevent unrestrained movements of pilot/autopilot
inputs from causing interferences or overloads.

         (2) The rule requires that the stop must be located to not appreciably affect the
control system range of travel due to wear, slackness, or take-up adjustments.

         (3) Each stop is required to withstand loads corresponding to design conditions.

         (4) In addition, each main rotor blade, if appropriate for the design, must have
stops to limit its travel about its hinge points. For rotors with hingeless design, stops
may be provided as appropriate to limit blade travel. Loads which result from the blade
hitting the stops (during starting or stopping the rotor or during any large but allowable
pilot control inputs such as autorotation cyclic flares or when subjected to ground gusts,
etc.) shall not overload the stops nor any rotor component.

     b. Procedures.

         (1) Stops are generally provided in the cockpit area and near any controllable
surface end of the control system (i.e., main rotor hub, tail rotor hub, and stabilizer
activators). For systems with control coupling or series actuators, stops have been
located farther downstream (away from the cockpit) to permit increased control output
during malfunction (hardover) or extreme control position cases.




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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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