FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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PDF page 271 of 1196

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 271
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AC 27-1B, Chg 2                                                           4/25/06

AC 27.602 § 27.602 CRITICAL PARTS.

     a. Explanation.

         (1) Critical parts requirements apply to structural components, rotor drive
systems, rotors, and mechanical control systems.

         (2) The objective of identifying critical parts is to ensure that critical parts are
controlled during design, manufacture, and throughout their service life so that the risk
of failure in service is minimized by ensuring that the critical parts maintain the critical
characteristics on which certification is based.

         (3) Definitions with respect to § 27.602:

                  (i)   The use of the word “could” in paragraph 27.602(a) of the rule means
that this failure assessment should consider the effect of flight regime (i.e., forward
flight, hover, etc.). The operational environment need not be considered.

                   (ii)   With respect to this rule, the term “catastrophic” means the inability to
conduct an autorotation to a safe landing, without exceptional piloting skills, assuming a
suitable landing surface is available.

                    (iii)  The use of the word “and” in paragraph 27.602(a) of the rule means
the part must have both a catastrophic failure mode together with one or more critical
characteristics.

               (iv)  With respect to this rule, the term “part” means one piece, or two or
more pieces permanently joined together.

              (v)   With respect to this rule, the term “critical characteristic” means any
dimension, tolerance, finish, material, or any manufacturing or inspection process, or
other feature which cannot tolerate variation from type design requirements and, if
nonconforming, would cause failure of the critical part.

         (4) Many rotorcraft manufacturers already have procedures in place within their
companies for handling “critical parts.” These plans may be required by their dealings
with other customers, frequently military (e.g., US DoD, UK MoD, Italian MoD).
Although these plans may have slightly different definitions of “critical parts” which have
sometimes been called “Flight Safety Parts,” “Critical Parts,” “Vital Parts,” or “Identifiable
Parts,” they have in the past been accepted as meeting the intent of this requirement
and providing the expected level of safety.  It is acceptable for these plans to use
alternative names and terminology provided they meet the intent of this requirement.

     b. Procedures. The rotorcraft manufacturer should establish a Critical Parts Plan,
which identifies and controls the critical characteristics. The policies and procedures
which constitute that plan should be such as to ensure that-­


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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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