Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
The source, within reach.
Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.
This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.
2/4/2016 AC 27-1B, Chg 7
(4) The AFCS sub-mode system architecture should support the following
functionalities:
(i) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS when any of
the automatic piloting modes are engaged, so that FADEC power limitations such as torque and
temperature are not exceeded.
(ii) If applicable, a system providing the aircraft height above the surface and final
pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that will
make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their station.
(iii) A system providing the aircraft heading and the pilot-selected heading at a
location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and
usable by any pilot at their station.
(iv) If applicable, a system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral ground
speeds and the pilot-selected longitudinal and lateral ground speeds when used by the AFCS in the flight
envelope where airspeed indications become unreliable. This information must be presented at a
location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that is plainly visible to and usable by
any pilot at their station.
(v) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic piloting
modes are engaged or transitioning from one mode to another.
(vi) A system that monitors for flight guidance deviations and failures with an
appropriate alerting function that enables the flight crew to take appropriate corrective action.
(vii) An alerting system that provides visual or aural alerts, or both, to the flight
crew when (if applicable) the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is reached, when an AFCS
malfunction occurs, and when the AFCS changes modes automatically from one AFCS mode to another.
Note: For normal transitions from one AFCS mode to another, a single visual or aural alert may suffice.
For an AFCS mode malfunction or a mode having a time-critical component, the flight crew
alerting system must activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take timely and appropriate
action. The alerting system means must be designed to alert the flight crew in order to minimize
crew errors that could create an additional hazard.
(5) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of its failure. The
occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing must be extremely
improbable. For any failure condition of the AFCS that is not shown to be extremely improbable, the
helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of continued safe flight without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control system should be
evaluated. Additionally, the AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous deviation in the
flight path or produce hazardous loads on the helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a
malfunction or failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period of time. Where
multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction conditions should be evaluated in sequence
unless their occurrence is shown to be improbable. A functional hazard assessment and a system safety
assessment should be provided in accordance with section 27.1309 of this AC to address the failure
conditions associated with the AFCS modes. The assessments should consider all systems required for
AFCS mode operation, including the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for example, radio altimeter),
and primary flight displays. Electrical and electronic systems with catastrophic failure conditions (for
example, AFCS) must comply with the § 27.1317(a)(4) High Intensity Radiated Field requirements.
(6) The AFCS modes should be demonstrated in the requested flight envelope.
Page Apdx B - 19
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
Start with the certification basis and the function.
Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.
A focused review, an agreed assessment package or ongoing support alongside your team. We can agree the relevant inputs and scope in the initial conversation.
This opens your email application.
Start a conversation
Tell us about your programme, the system you are developing and the support you need.
We can agree a focused use-case review, a defined evidence package or ongoing programme support.
This opens your email application.
Specialist aerospace expertise
Aerospace Consulting is led by Hussein Khimji, an FAA Designated Engineering Representative in systems and equipment, with a focus on system safety, flight controls and avionics.
We work with aircraft developers and systems suppliers to connect technical decisions, safety assessments and certification evidence.
This is the proposed introduction. The full About page will add your approved biography and associate expertise.
Systems engineering & development assurance
Tell us about the aircraft or system, its intended function, stage of development and the support you need.