FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/12/03                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 1

         (3) Ground Based Equipment Installation.

                  (i)   Ground based equipment is typically used to process and display the
data collected by airborne means. This processed data will ultimately be used to make
decisions pertaining to some intervention action or provide data to other processing
means to make the intervention action determination. Since the ground based
equipment may be an important part of the process for determination of intervention
actions, its integrity and accuracy requirements must be the same as any other part of
the HUMS process.

                   (ii)   The determination of compliance to the integrity requirements for
ground based equipment is difficult when it is recognized that this equipment may, for
the most part, be commercial and not necessarily designed specifically for the HUMS
application. This section is intended to allow for the possibility of systems that contain
COTS hardware and software, where the hardware is likely to be a personal computer
and the operational software is COTS. The determination of compliance to the integrity
requirements for COTS is based on equivalence, which is subjective. COTS service
history alone will not be sufficient to comply with the requirements herein. Any ground
based processing equipment that consists of commercial hardware and software must
have satisfactory service history and an independent means of verifying the results of
the processing. This independent verification means may be discontinued with the
certifying Authority's agreement to modify the original HUMS approval and remove this
requirement after significant quantities of the processed data consistently agree with the
verifying means.

NOTE: The suggested processes contained in this document for acceptance of a
ground based system that possibly includes COTS hardware and software is limited to
ground based equipment for HUMS applications only. The integrity determination
methods for systems that do not contain COTS is the same as described for the
airborne systems.

              (A) Independent Verification Means. The required independent
verification means may consist of any one of many methods. Independent verification
means may parallel only the ground based system processing or parallel all or any
portion of the process that includes the COTS equipment processing. Some acceptable
methods may include the following:

               (1) Physical inspection(s).

               (2) Redundant processing by a second dissimilar PC with different COTS
from the primary processor.

               (3) A combination of physical inspection(s) and independent dissimilar
processing.




                                                       Page MG 15 - 9

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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