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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/4/2016                                                            AC 27-1B, Chg 7

 Note: Not all ATA chapters or subchapters have been included. Also, the italicized entries are not usually included in the
                       failure condition description but in the systems description or assumptions section.


ATA 22-00-00 – AUTO FLIGHT SYSTEM
                      Failure      Phase of    Effect of the Failure on    Classification  Notes         Supporting   Verification       FunctionATA                Condition    Operation  the Aircraft, Crew and    of the FC       (assumptions)  Material    Method       Description                    (FC)                   Occupants
                                                                                                                         Analysis and2211   Autopilot     Loss of                The detection of the loss                           ALL                                                                                           Flt Test      Computer      autopilot.                  of system by the crew
                                                could be delayed long
                                            enough to significantly
                                                reduce the safety margins
                                                   or functional capabilities.
                                                      Aircraft responds with a                                                  Analysis and                      Malfunction                                   Hover, TO   rapid attitude change,                                                              Flt Test                       (hardover)                               App/Lnd     resulting in a possible                         in a single                                                   departure from stable                          axis.                                                              flight, or impact with
                                                         terrain or ground-based
                                                       obstacles.

                                                     Substantial increase in
                                                  aircrew workload to
                                                  recover from the resulting
                                                unusual attitude.

                                            Minimal effect on
                                                occupants as they will be
                                                   required to be seated and
                                                    belted during this phase of
                                                     operation.



                              Figure AC 27 MG 21-1. Generic Examples by ATA.

                                                                                Page MG 21 - 5

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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