FAA / Advisory circular

AC 21.17-4

Type Certification—Powered-lift

Follow the FAA powered-lift certification approach and navigate the airworthiness criteria in Appendix A.

Start with the scope.

Appendix A gives an acceptable means for certain powered-lift under §21.17(b). These criteria are not universally applicable CFR requirements; establish the basis for the particular aircraft.

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07/18/2025                                               AC 21.17-4
                                                                        Appendix A

(2) From the minimum obtainable power or thrust while in flight, and while on the ground, to the
highest rated power or thrust within a time interval determined to be appropriate for the intended
aircraft application; and
(3) From the minimum torque to the highest rated torque without detrimental engine effects in
the intended aircraft application.
(b) The transient response time for each respective power condition in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2),
and (a)(3) of this section must be documented in accordance with the requirements in PL.3305.
PL.3374 Continued rotation.
If the design allows any of the engine main rotating systems to continue to rotate after the engine
is shut down while in-flight, this continued rotation must not result in any hazardous engine
effects, as defined in PL.3375(g)(2).
PL.3375 Safety analysis.
(a)
(1) The applicant must analyze the engine, including the control system, to assess the likely
consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. This analysis will take into
account, if applicable:
(i) Aircraft-level devices and procedures assumed to be associated with the intended aircraft
application. Such assumptions must be stated in the analysis.
(ii) Consequential secondary failures and latent failures.
(iii) Multiple failures referred to in paragraph (d) of this section or that result in the hazardous
engine effects defined in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
(2) The applicant must summarize those failures that could result in major engine effects or
hazardous engine effects, as defined in paragraph (g) of this section, and estimate the probability
of occurrence of those effects. Any engine part the failure of which could reasonably result in a
hazardous engine effect must be clearly identified in this summary.
(b) The applicant must comply with paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section using the failure
definitions in paragraph (g) of this section.
(c) The primary failure of certain single elements cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical
terms. If the failure of such elements is likely to result in hazardous engine effects, then
compliance may be shown by reliance on the prescribed integrity requirements such as PL.3315,
PL.3327, PL.3370, as applicable. These instances must be stated in the safety analysis.
(d) If reliance is placed on a safety system to prevent a failure from progressing to hazardous
engine effects, the possibility of a safety system failure in combination with a basic engine
failure must be included in the analysis. Such a safety system may include safety devices,
instrumentation, early warning devices, maintenance checks, and other similar equipment or
procedures. If items of a safety system are outside the control of the engine manufacturer, the
assumptions of the safety analysis with respect to the reliability of these parts must be clearly
stated in the analysis and documented in accordance with the requirements in PL.3305.
(e) If the safety analysis depends on one or more of the following items, those items must be
identified in the analysis and appropriately substantiated.

                                       A-37

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Begin with the aircraft and the agreed basis.

Connect the operating concept, aircraft-level failure effects, system architecture and assurance planning. Keep FAA powered-lift criteria and EASA SC-VTOL provisions distinct when developing the safety and certification approach.

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