FAA / Advisory circular

AC 21.17-4

Type Certification—Powered-lift

Follow the FAA powered-lift certification approach and navigate the airworthiness criteria in Appendix A.

Start with the scope.

Appendix A gives an acceptable means for certain powered-lift under §21.17(b). These criteria are not universally applicable CFR requirements; establish the basis for the particular aircraft.

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07/18/2025                                               AC 21.17-4
                                                                        Appendix A

(1) The engine control system must be designed such that the loss, malfunction, or interruption
of the control system electrical power source will not result in a hazardous engine effect,
unacceptable transmission of erroneous data, or continued engine operation in the absence of the
control function. Hazardous engine effects are defined in PL.3375(g)(2). The engine control
system must be capable of resuming normal operation when aircraft-supplied power returns to
within the declared limits.
(2) The applicant must identify, and document in accordance with the requirements in PL.3305,
the characteristics of any electrical power supplied from the aircraft to the engine control system,
including transient and steady-state voltage limits, and any other characteristics necessary for
safe operation of the engine.
PL.3329 Instrument connection.
(a) Unless it is constructed to prevent its connection to an incorrect instrument, each connection
provided for powerplant instruments required by aircraft airworthiness regulations or necessary
to insure operation of the engine in compliance with any engine limitation must be marked to
identify it with its corresponding instrument.
(b) In addition, as part of the system safety assessment of PL.3328(g) and PL.3326(h), the
applicant must assess the possibility and subsequent effect of incorrect fit of instruments,
sensors, or connectors. Where practicable, the applicant must take design precautions to prevent
incorrect configuration of the system.
(c) The applicant must make provision for the installation of instrumentation necessary to ensure
operation in compliance with engine operating limitations. Where, in presenting the safety
analysis, or complying with any other requirement, dependence is placed on instrumentation that
is not otherwise mandatory in the assumed aircraft installation, then the applicant must specify
this instrumentation in the engine installation instructions and declare it mandatory in the engine
approval documentation.
(d) The applicant must provide instrumentation enabling the flight crew to monitor the
functioning of the engine cooling system unless evidence shows that:
(1) Other existing instrumentation provides adequate warning of failure or impending failure;
(2) Failure of the cooling system would not lead to hazardous engine effects, as defined in
PL.3375(g)(2), before detection; or
(3) The probability of failure of the cooling system is extremely remote.
(e) The sensors, together with associated wiring and signal conditioning, must be segregated,
electrically and physically, to the extent necessary to ensure that the probability of a fault
propagating from instrumentation and monitoring functions to control functions, or vice versa, is
consistent with the failure effect of the fault.
PL.3362 Stress analysis.
(a) A mechanical and thermal stress analysis, as well as an analysis of the stress caused by
electromagnetic forces, must show a sufficient design margin to prevent unacceptable operating
characteristics and hazardous engine effects as defined in PL.3375(g)(2).
(b) Maximum stresses in the engine must be determined by test, validated analysis, or a
combination thereof, and must be shown not to exceed minimum material properties.

                                       A-34

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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