FAA / Advisory circular

AC 21.17-4

Type Certification—Powered-lift

Follow the FAA powered-lift certification approach and navigate the airworthiness criteria in Appendix A.

Start with the scope.

Appendix A gives an acceptable means for certain powered-lift under §21.17(b). These criteria are not universally applicable CFR requirements; establish the basis for the particular aircraft.

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07/18/2025                                              AC 21.17-4
                                                                        Appendix A

(2) The engine to the aircraft via energy regeneration, and any other characteristics necessary for
safe operation of the engine.
(f) Environmental limits. Environmental limits that cannot adequately be substantiated by
endurance demonstration, validated analysis, or a combination thereof must be demonstrated by
the system and component tests in PL.3391.
(g) Electrical-system failures. The engine electrical system must—
(1) Have a maximum rate of loss of power control (LOPC) that is suitable for the intended
aircraft application;
(2) When in the full-up configuration, be single fault tolerant, as determined by the
Administrator, for electrical, electrically detectable, and electronic failures involving LOPC
events;
(3) Not have any single failure that results in hazardous engine effects as defined in
PL.3375(g)(2); and
(4) Ensure any electrical system failures or malfunctions that lead to local events in the intended
aircraft application do not result in hazardous engine effects as defined in PL.3375(g)(2).
(h) System safety assessment. The applicant must perform a system safety assessment. This
assessment must identify faults or failures that affect normal operation, together with the
predicted frequency of occurrence of these faults or failures. The intended aircraft application
must be taken into account to assure the assessment of the engine system safety is valid. The
rates of hazardous and major faults must be declared and documented in accordance with the
requirements in PL.3305.
PL.3327 Overspeed.
(a) A rotor overspeed must not result in a burst, rotor growth, or damage that results in a
hazardous engine effect, as defined in PL.3375(g)(2). Compliance with this paragraph must be
shown by test, validated analysis, or a combination of both. Applicable assumed rotor speeds
must be declared and justified.
(b) Rotors must possess sufficient strength with a margin to burst above approved operating
conditions and above failure conditions leading to rotor overspeed. The margin to burst must be
shown by test, validated analysis, or a combination thereof.
(c) The engine must not exceed the rotor-speed operational limitations that could affect rotor
structural integrity.
PL.3328 Engine control systems.
(a) Applicability. These requirements apply to any system or device that is part of the engine
type design that controls, limits, monitors, or protects engine operation and is necessary for the
continued airworthiness of the engine.
(b) Engine control. The engine control system must ensure that the engine does not experience
any unacceptable operating characteristics or exceed its operating limits, including in failure
conditions where the fault or failure results in a change from one control mode to another, from
one channel to another, or from the primary system to the back-up system, if applicable.


                                       A-32

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Begin with the aircraft and the agreed basis.

Connect the operating concept, aircraft-level failure effects, system architecture and assurance planning. Keep FAA powered-lift criteria and EASA SC-VTOL provisions distinct when developing the safety and certification approach.

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