FAA / Advisory circular

AC 20-152A

Development Assurance for Airborne Electronic Hardware

Development assurance for custom airborne hardware, COTS devices, COTS IP and circuit board assemblies.

Start with the scope.

This AC recognises DO-254/ED-80 and adds objectives for distinct hardware categories. Its stated applicability covers hardware contributing to DAL A, B and C functions; the relevant objective restrictions still apply.

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10/7/22                                                 AC 20-152A

        •  Unused functions and the means (internal/external) used to deactivate them,
        •  Means to control any inadvertent activation of the unused functions, or inadvertent
             deactivation of the used functions,
        •  Means to manage device resets,
        •  Power-on configuration,
        •  Clocking configuration (e.g., identification of the different clock domains), and
        •  Operating conditions (e.g., clock frequency, power supply level, temperature, etc.).

         Objective COTS-7
        The applicant should ensure that the usage of the COTS device has been defined and
          verified according to the intended function of the hardware. This also includes the
        hardware-software interface and the hardware to (other) hardware interface.
       When a COTS device is used in a hardware DAL A or B function, the applicant should
       show that unused functions of the COTS device do not compromise the integrity and
          availability of the COTS device’s used functions.
        Note 1: For unused functions of the COTS device, it is recommended that an effective
         deactivation means is used and verified, when available.
        Note 2: Verification should be performed at an appropriate level (hardware, software,
         equipment).

        ED-80/DO-254, Section 10.3.2.2.4 introduces hardware/software (HW/SW) interface
          data, which can be used as a reference to define the software interface data of the COTS
         device.
       Some additional consideration should be given to the critical configuration settings.
        Those are defined as the settings that are deemed necessary by the applicant for the
         proper usage of the hardware, which, if inadvertently altered, could change the behavior
         of the COTS device, causing it to no longer fulfill the hardware intended function.

         Objective COTS-8
            If the complex COTS device contributes to DAL A or B functions, the applicant should
        develop and verify a means that ensures an appropriate mitigation is specified in the
         event of any inadvertent alteration of the “critical configuration settings” of the COTS
         device.
        Note: The mitigation means might be defined at the hardware, software, or system
           level, or a combination of these. The mitigation means may also be defined by the safety
        assessment process.

7     DEVELOPMENT ASSURANCE OF CIRCUIT BOARD ASSEMBLIES (CBA)
        This section provides guidance for the development assurance of CBA (a board or a
         collection of boards).


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Define the hardware assurance approach by function and device.

Use the PHAC to identify intended functions, assurance levels, custom and COTS boundaries, and the evidence needed for each applicable objective. Keep supplier information, integration verification and system-level assumptions connected.

Discuss the system and hardware assurance approach →
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