FAA / Advisory circular

AC 20-152A

Development Assurance for Airborne Electronic Hardware

Development assurance for custom airborne hardware, COTS devices, COTS IP and circuit board assemblies.

Start with the scope.

This AC recognises DO-254/ED-80 and adds objectives for distinct hardware categories. Its stated applicability covers hardware contributing to DAL A, B and C functions; the relevant objective restrictions still apply.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page 23

PDF page 23 of 31

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page; extracted words support search. Text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 20-152A, PDF page 23
AC 20-152A · 23Open saved PDF here ↗
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

10/7/22                                                 AC 20-152A

                  by the applicant, the microcode will not be considered to be part of the
                       qualified COTS device.

                     Objective COTS-4
                             If the microcode is not qualified by the device manufacturer or if it is
                     modified by the applicant, the applicant should ensure that a means of
                    compliance for this microcode integrated within the COTS device is
                   proposed by the appropriate process and is commensurate with the usage
                       of the COTS device.
                    Note: the PHAC (or any other related planning document) should
                   document the existence of the microcode and refer to the process
                    (hardware, software, system) where it is addressed.

6.4.2   COTS Device Malfunctions
       Some COTS devices may contain errors that may or may not have been detected by the
         device manufacturer.

         Objective COTS-5
        The applicant should assess the errata of the COTS device that are relevant to the use
          of the device in the intended application and identify and verify the means of mitigation
          for those errata. If the mitigation means is not implemented in hardware, the mitigation
       means should be fed back to and verified by the appropriate process.
        Note: The above objective refers to any mitigation means (such as hardware, software,
         system, or other means.)

         Objective COTS-6
        The applicant should identify the failure modes of the used functions of the device and
         the possible associated common modes, and feed both of these back to the system safety
        assessment process.

6.4.3    Usage of COTS Devices
        This section focuses on the usage of complex COTS devices, while Section 7 covers the
         overall circuit board assembly development process. This Section refers to the term
         “intended function of the hardware,” which is considered to be defined through the
     CBA development process.
       Complex COTS devices can have multiple functions and many configurations of those
         functions. The configuration of a device should be managed in order to provide the
          ability to consistently apply the required configuration settings, to replicate the
         configuration on another item, and to modify the configuration in a controlled manner,
       when modification is necessary.
       The configuration of the device addresses at least the following topics:
        •  Used functions (e.g., identification of each function, configuration characteristics,
          modes of operation),

                                         23

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Define the hardware assurance approach by function and device.

Use the PHAC to identify intended functions, assurance levels, custom and COTS boundaries, and the evidence needed for each applicable objective. Keep supplier information, integration verification and system-level assumptions connected.

Discuss the system and hardware assurance approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

31 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 06b17bec98562261063d87e518df3fe581412a5dce64b39ef4769c57433b6bc6

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →