FAA / Advisory circular

AC 20-115D

Airborne Software Development Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-12( ) and RTCA DO-178( )

Software development assurance, recognised standards and the treatment of new development and previously approved software.

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This AC recognises DO-178C/ED-12C, DO-330/ED-215 and the model-based, object-oriented and formal-methods supplements. Apply the relevant provisions to the software and certification context.

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7/21/17                                                AC 20-115D


        (3) The intent of this subparagraph is to provide clarification of section MB.6.8.1 of ED-
218/DO-331.  If you are using models as defined in section MB.1.0 of ED-218/DO-331 as the
basis for developing software, you should apply the guidance in ED-218/DO-331. When
applying section MB.6.8.1 of ED-218/DO-331, you should:

             (a)  Identify what reviews and analyses objectives are planned to be satisfied by
simulation alone or in combination with reviews and analyses; all other objectives should be
satisfied by reviews and analyses as described in section MB.6.3 of ED-218/DO-331.

             (b)  For each identified objective, justify in detail, how the simulation activity, alone
or in combination with reviews and analyses, fully satisfies the specific reviews and analyses
objective.

    b. Guidance for Field Loadable Software (FLS). This section supplements ED-12C/DO-
178C and ED-12B/DO-178B. Use this guidance in addition to ED-12C/DO-178C and ED-
12B/DO-178B when using FLS in your project.

        (1) As the developer, you should provide the necessary information to support the
system-level guidance identified in items a, b, c and d of ED-12C/DO-178C section 2.5.5; and
items a, b, c and d of ED-12B/DO-178B section 2.5.

        (2) The FLS should be protected against corruption or partial loading to an integrity
level appropriate for the software level of the FLS.

        (3) The FLS part number, when loaded in the airborne equipment, should be verifiable
by appropriate means.

        (4)  Protection mechanisms should be implemented to prevent inadvertent enabling of
the field loading function during flight or any other safety-critical phase.

    c.  Guidance for User Modifiable Software (UMS). This section supplements ED-
12C/DO-178C and ED-12B/DO-178B. You should use this guidance in addition to ED-12C/DO-
178C and ED-12B/DO-178B when using UMS in your project.

        (1) As the developer, you should provide the necessary information to support system-
level guidance identified in items a, b, c and f of ED-12C/DO-178C section 2.5.2; and items a
and b of ED-12B/DO-178B section 2.4.

        (2) The modifiable part of the component should be developed to a software level at
least as high as the software level assigned to that software.

9.  Modifying and Re-using Software Approved using ED-12/DO-178, ED-12A/DO-178A,
or ED-12B/DO-178B.

    a. We previously approved the software for many airborne systems using ED-12/DO-178,
ED-12A/DO-178A, or ED-12B/DO-178B as a means of compliance. In this AC, reference to
legacy software includes the previously approved software or a component(s) that makes up the
software used in legacy systems. In this subparagraph, we describe how to demonstrate


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Keep software assurance connected to the system.

Make the software level, allocated requirements, interface assumptions and verification responsibilities explicit. Plan the evidence and review points early, and trace changes back to the system safety and certification assumptions.

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