FAA / Advisory circular

AC 20-152A

Development Assurance for Airborne Electronic Hardware

Development assurance for custom airborne hardware, COTS devices, COTS IP and circuit board assemblies.

Start with the scope.

This AC recognises DO-254/ED-80 and adds objectives for distinct hardware categories. Its stated applicability covers hardware contributing to DAL A, B and C functions; the relevant objective restrictions still apply.

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      custom device netlist (inserted by the user, called from a library, or selected by the user
       as a library function). Firm IP will be placed and routed in the AEH custom device

       In this document, the terminology “a/the Firm IP” refers to a piece of hardware that is
      Firm IP per this definition.

    c. Hard IP
      Hard IP is COTS IP defined as a physical layout (stream, polygon, GDSII format, etc.).

      Hard IP is instantiated by the IP user during the physical design layout stage;
        alternatively, Hard IP is embedded into the silicon of the FPGA/PLD by the FPGA
       provider/device manufacturer.

       In this document, the terminology “a/the Hard IP” refers to a piece of hardware that is
      Hard IP per this definition.

Complex COTS device maturity – A complex device is mature when the risk of an unintended
function or misbehavior is low. The risk of anomalous behavior decreases as a device is widely
used and device errata are documented and communicated to the users of the device.

Critical configuration settings – Those configuration settings that the applicant has determined
to be necessary for the proper usage of the hardware, which, if inadvertently altered, could
change the behavior of the COTS device, causing it to no longer fulfil its intended function.

Development assurance for use of COTS device – All the planned and systematic activities
conducted to provide adequate confidence and evidence that the complex COTS device safely
performs its intended function under its operating conditions.

Hardware design assurance level of a function – Refer to ED-80/DO-254, Table 2-1 for the
definition of DAL A, B, C, and D functions.

Hybrid device – An integrated circuit combining different semiconductor dies and passive
components on a substrate.

IP libraries – “IP libraries” used in the COTS IP definition refers to all sub-modules, sub-
blocks, or other design sub-functions that are formally/commercially made available by a COTS
IP provider and intended for integration within a COTS IP by the COTS IP user. However,
Macro Cells for FPGAs or Standard Cells for ASICs are not considered to be IP libraries, hence
they are not related to the COTS IP topic referred to in this document.

Microcode – This term often refers to a hardware-level set of instructions. It is typically stored
in the COTS device’s high-speed memory, and microcode instructions are generally translated
into sequences of detailed circuit-level operations. Microcode may be used in general-purpose
microprocessors, microcontrollers, digital signal processors, channel controllers, disk controllers,
network interface controllers, network processors, graphics processing units, and other hardware.
A Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) is an example of microcode, which is used to initialize
microprocessor input and output process operations.

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Define the hardware assurance approach by function and device.

Use the PHAC to identify intended functions, assurance levels, custom and COTS boundaries, and the evidence needed for each applicable objective. Keep supplier information, integration verification and system-level assumptions connected.

Discuss the system and hardware assurance approach →
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