FAA / Advisory circular

AC 20-152A

Development Assurance for Airborne Electronic Hardware

Development assurance for custom airborne hardware, COTS devices, COTS IP and circuit board assemblies.

Start with the scope.

This AC recognises DO-254/ED-80 and adds objectives for distinct hardware categories. Its stated applicability covers hardware contributing to DAL A, B and C functions; the relevant objective restrictions still apply.

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10/7/22                                                 AC 20-152A

2     APPLICABILITY
        This AC may be used by applicants, design approval holders, and developers of
         airborne systems and equipment containing airborne electronic hardware (AEH) to be
          installed on type certificated aircraft, engines, and propellers. This AC also applies to
         developers of TSO articles.
        This AC is applicable to AEH that contributes to hardware development assurance level
       (DAL) A, DAL B, or DAL C functions.
      When an objective is not applicable to a specific hardware DAL, the applicability
          restriction is directly indicated within the objective text with the following convention
          for instance: “For DAL A hardware….” For airborne electronic hardware contributing
          to hardware DAL C functions, only a limited set of objectives applies.
       Even though there is a benefit in having a structured development process that ensures
        a proper flow-down of requirements to the hardware and the fulfilment by the hardware
         of the intended function, use of this AC is not required for AEH contributing to
        hardware DAL D functions. AC 00-72, Best Practices for Airborne Electronic
       Hardware Design Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-80( ) and RTCA DO-254( ),
         provides some clarifications that may be used to ensure that the DAL D hardware
        performs its intended function.

3     CANCELLATION
        This AC cancels AC 20-152, RTCA, INC., Document RTCA/DO-254, Design
        Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, dated June 30, 2005.

4    BACKGROUND
        This AC is related to the development of custom devices in AEH, including the use of
         commercial-off-the-shelf intellectual property (COTS IP) within custom devices, the
        use of COTS devices, and the development of circuit board assemblies (CBA). Each of
         these topics is organized with:
        •  Background information dedicated to each major topic,
        •   Applicability, and
        •  Sections where objectives are described and uniquely identified.
     A unique identifier for each objective is defined with a prefix and an index number (i)
         as follows:
        •  For the development of custom devices, the identifier is “CD-i”;
        •  For the use of COTS IP in custom devices, the identifier is “IP-i”;
        •  For the use of COTS devices, the identifier is “COTS-i”;
        •  For the development of circuit board assemblies, the identifier is “CBA-i.”
         Objectives are also differentiated from the rest of the text by formatting in italics.

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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Define the hardware assurance approach by function and device.

Use the PHAC to identify intended functions, assurance levels, custom and COTS boundaries, and the evidence needed for each applicable objective. Keep supplier information, integration verification and system-level assumptions connected.

Discuss the system and hardware assurance approach →
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